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MUTUAL FUND ADVISORY FEES: AN OBJECTIVE
FIDUCIARY STANDARD
Stewart L. Brown, PhD., CFA*
ABSTRACT
Mutual funds are structurally different from other corporations. The
corporation or trust is controlled by an external entity: an investment
management firm that profits from fees charged to manage the fund’s
portfolio. Recognizing this fundamental conflict of interest, in 1970
Congress made investment management firms fiduciaries with respect to
fees charged their captive funds. In the nearly fifty years since then, the
courts have interpreted their fiduciary duty so narrowly that no plaintiff has
met the judicially established fiduciary standard. This paper presents and
analyzes empirical evidence on advisory and sub-advisory fees and shows
how the courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission can better
enforce the fiduciary duty imposed on investment management firms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has recognized that the forces of arm’s length
bargaining do not operate in the determination of mutual fund advisory
fees.1 The reason for this is well-known: mutual funds are captives of the
investment management firms that bring them into existence and manage
their portfolios. As a result, there is an unseverable relationship between
investment management firms, also known as fund sponsors, and their
captive funds.2 Essentially, each mutual fund faces a monopoly seller of
investment advisory services.3
Studies by the Wharton School4 and the Securities and Exchange
Commission5 in the 1960’s showed mutual fund investment management
fees much higher than investment management fees on portfolios where
arm’s length bargaining was present. This led to the 1970 amendments6 to
the ICA7 whereby Congress made investment management firms
fiduciaries with respect to fees and gave fund investors a private cause of
action against excessive fees.
Prior to the 1970 amendments, fund investors were unsuccessful in
challenging fees principally because the applicable standard was one of
corporate waste wherein the fee needed to be so high that it shocked the
conscience of the court.8 Congress made clear that its intent was for
1. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 338 (2010) (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441
U.S. 471, 481 (1979)).
2. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1982).
3. The terms “advisory fee” and “investment management fee” are used
interchangeably throughout this paper.
4. WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. & COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP.
NO. 87-2274 (2d Sess. 1962) [hereinafter WHARTON REPORT].
5. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337 (2d Sess. 1966) [hereinafter PPI STUDY].
6. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006)) [hereinafter 1970
amendments].
7. Investment Company and Investment Advisor’s Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-678,
54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (2012))
[hereinafter 1940 ICA].
8. See Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962) (evaluating the
compensation stipulated by an advisory contract using the corporate waste standard); see
also PPI STUDY, supra note 5, at 142 (discussing that advisory fees will not be challenged
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advisory fees to be fairer and that the corporate waste standard was too
restrictive. It did not articulate a fiduciary standard for the revised statute
because it thought existing fiduciary standards would apply.9 Instead, after
the 1970 amendments, the judiciary established a unique fiduciary standard
to gauge the excessiveness of advisory fees under the newly created statute.
In doing so the courts effectively ignored the existing corporate fiduciary
standard established in Pepper v. Litton, stated as whether under all the
circumstances “the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s length
bargain.”10
In Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
defying the expressed desire of Congress to use the already-established
fiduciary standard, established a fiduciary standard that in operation has
had an impact similar to the corporate waste standard. The appellate court
in Gartenberg initially modified the Pepper v. Litton fiduciary standard
slightly: “the test is essentially whether the fee schedule represents a charge
within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s-length.”11
The notion of a range of fees implicitly introduces a new, mathematical
dimension to the Pepper standard but is otherwise consistent with the
notion of “earmarks of arm’s length” negotiations. However, the
Gartenberg court then determined that the appropriate standard was that
“the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large
that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could
not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”12 The Gartenberg
standard has proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for plaintiffs in §
36(b) cases. No plaintiffs have ever received an award under the statute.13
In that sense, the Gartenberg standard is indistinguishable from the
corporate waste standard that Congress explicitly criticized. As Lyman
Johnson has commented: “Either no adviser has breached its fiduciary duty
by charging an excessive fee or something is amiss under section 36(b).”14
unless the courts consider them to be shocking).
9. See Amy Y. Yeung & Kristen J. Freeman, Gartenberg, Jones, and the Meaning of
Fiduciary: A Legislative Investigation of Section 36(B), 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 483, 488 (2010)
(explaining that the statute that provided a private right of action against advisers for breach
of fiduciary duties did not actually define “fiduciary duty”).
10. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-7 (1939).
11. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982).
12. Id.
13. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1109
(6th ed. 2009) (stating “[s]ubsequent litigation in excessive fee cases has resulted almost
uniformly in judgments for the defendants”).
14. Lyman Johnson, A Fresh Look at Director “Independence”: Mutual Fund Fee
Litigation and Gartenberg at Twenty-Five, 61 VAND. L. REV. 497, 519 (2008) [hereinafter
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There is evidence that advisory fees continue to be substantially above
levels of fees established by arm’s length bargaining.15 In addition, recent
research shows investment advisory fees over time are essentially constant
despite economies of scale and spiraling levels of assets.16 Moreover, the
same research reveals that mutual fund investment management firms earn
extraordinarily high rates of return for their owners over very long time
periods.17 This evidence is consistent with the proposition that investment
managers earn monopoly profits for owners.
In keeping with Professor Johnson’s observation, it follows that
something is indeed amiss with § 36(b). The main thesis of this paper is
that the Gartenberg standard is unfairly punitive to plaintiffs in advisory
fee cases because it is subjective and excessively restrictive. The paper’s
conclusion is that the Gartenberg court and subsequent courts interpreting
§ 36(b) have adopted a pro-industry approach that is not warranted by the
history of § 36(b). The purpose of this paper is to develop and apply a
fiduciary standard that is empirically based and objective. If applied in
advisory fee cases, this standard could result in fairer advisory fees for
investors. Although there is some ambiguity in the legislative history of
the 1970 amendments, an objective fiduciary standard requiring fairer
advisory fees would be far more consistent with the stated intent of
Congress than is the present standard.
Until recently, most plaintiffs in § 36(b) cases have compared
advisory fees to fees determined by arm’s length bargaining, e.g., fees
charged to pension funds and other institutional customers. This trend was
set in the early 2000s following publication of a paper showing that fees on
mutual fund portfolios were roughly double comparable fees on public
pension portfolios.18 While many of these cases settled, plaintiffs have not
succeeded in any of those that have come to trial.19 The most notable of
Johnson, Fresh Look].
15. See John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of
Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609 (2001) [hereinafter Freeman & Brown, Mutual Fund
Fee Litigation] (examining “whether the chief product that shareholders buy when they
invest in mutual funds—professional investment advice—is being systematically overpriced
by fund managers”); see also Stewart L. Brown & Steven Pomerantz, Some Clarity on
Mutual Fund Fees, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 767 (2018) [hereinafter Brown & Pomerantz, Some
Clarity] (presenting “evidence that investment management fees, a major component of total
fees are immune to the forces of competition”).
16. Brown & Pomerantz, Some Clarity, supra note 15, at 812.
17. Id. at 810.
18. Freeman & Brown, Mutual Fund Fee Litigation, supra note 15, at 638.
19. Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 823 n.4 (8th Cir. 2009);
Johnson, Fresh Look, supra note 14, at 500.
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these cases is Jones v. Harris20 in which the Supreme Court affirmed the
Gartenberg standard, thus allowing the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment for defendants to stand.21
In this line of cases the investment management industry has argued,
successfully, that mutual fund and pension fees are not comparable because
of higher costs required to manage mutual funds. The industry argues that
it is more expensive to manage mutual fund portfolios because of the costs
to service large numbers of mutual fund investors and the greater level of
cash that must be held to cover potential withdrawals. Recent research
effectively debunks these arguments but has not yet been given credence by
the judiciary.22
Recently, plaintiffs have chosen a different but related line of attack
on advisory fees. These cases utilize sub-advisory fees as a comparator to
advisory fees. Like pension fees, sub-advisory fees are much lower than
advisory fees and are the product of arm’s length bargaining. Moreover,
such fees are not subject to the defects of pension fees because sub-
advisors must deal with the existence of large numbers of customers and
the concomitant risk of cash withdrawal. Despite these advantages, initial
results are not promising for plaintiffs, largely because courts have applied
the subjective Gartenberg standard and readily grant summary judgment to
defendants. However, there are still some cases pending that might benefit
from the application of an objective fiduciary standard.
With that as a beginning point, it would be useful if courts in fee cases
had a large a representative sample of fees determined by arm’s length
bargaining as a benchmark for comparison purposes. Fortunately, there
have come into existence in recent years databases that compile such data,
one of which is Morningstar Direct. Utilizing that database, this paper
presents and analyzes a large sample of actual sub-advisory fee data and
compares these numbers to the advisory fees of mutual funds with similar
investment objectives. The principal insight is that a large proportion of
mutual fund advisory fees are well outside the range of fees determined by
arm’s length bargaining. The use of the empirically grounded fiduciary
standard suggested here greatly clarifies the issues.
The paper is structured as follows: first, an overview of the Wharton
20. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010).
21. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 611 F. App’x. 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2015).
22. Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fee Litigation: Some Analytical Clarity,
16 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 329 (2016) [hereinafter Brown, Some Analytical Clarity]; John P.
Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of
Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 671-73 (2001).
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Report and PPI Study results is presented and the testimony of the then
SEC Chairman during the hearings leading to the 1970 amendments23 is
surveyed. The testimony includes evidence of then-contemporary
empirical data on sub-advisory fees. Next, the relevant sections of the
Senate Report underpinning the 1970 amendments to the ICA are
examined. Third, the Gartenberg standard is presented and discussed as is
the subsequent profit margin standard established in Schuyt.24 Fourth, the
empirical evidence on sub-advisory fees compared to advisory fees is
examined in detail. The analysis includes statistical tests relevant to
establishing an objective fiduciary standard. Fifth, the objective standard is
applied to a case already decided using the subjective standard: Kasilag v.
Hartford.25 This case is notable for the depth and breadth of mutual fund
and investment management numbers presented that allow for an
23. See Investment Company Act Amendments of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 9510
and H.R. 9511, Pt. 1, 90th Cong. 25 (1967) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman,
Securities & Exchange Commission) (testifying in support of H.R. 9510 and H.R. 9511);
Investment Company Act Amendments of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 9510 and
H.R. 9511, Pt. 2, 90th Cong. 671 (1967) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman,
Securities & Exchange Commission)(testifying in support of H.R. 9510 and H.R. 9511);
Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency on
Amendment No. 438 to S. 1659, 90th Cong. 91 (1967) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen,
Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission) (testifying in support of S. 1659);
Investment Company Act Amendments of 1967, Bank and Insurance Company Collective
Investment Funds and Accounts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce & Fin. of the
H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong. 112 (1968) (statement of
Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission) (testifying on H.R.
14742 to amend the Investment Company Act of 1940 in addition to other securities laws).
See also Problems in the Securities Industry: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Securities
of the Comm. on Banking & Currency to Ascertain the Views of Hamer H. Budge, Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, on Problems in the Securities Industry, 91st
Cong. 3 (1969) (explaining his position regarding mutual fund bills S. 34 and S. 296, among
other matters); Mutual Fund Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce &
Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R.
13754, and H.R. 14737, Pt. 1, 91st Cong. 172 (1969) (statement of Hamer H. Budge,
Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission) (speaking in regard to H.R. 11995, S. 2224,
H.R. 13754, and H.R. 14737); Mutual Fund Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 11995,
S. 2224, H.R. 13754, and H.R. 14737, Pt. 2, 91st Cong. 853 (1969) (statement of Hamer H.
Budge, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission) (advocating for legislation that
deals with managerial compensation in investment companies).
24. Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
25. Kasilag v. Hartford Inv. Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 11-1083, 2017 WL 773880 (D.N.J.
Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d, No. 17-1653, 2018 WL 3913102 (3d Cir. Aug. 15, 2018).
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exemplary clarity of analysis. Next, there is an extended discussion and
critique of the Gartenberg standard, including the conflicting signals sent
by Congress to the judiciary during the period leading up to the 1970
amendments. And, last, a summary and conclusions are presented.
II. THE 1970 AMENDMENTS TO THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT
The Wharton Report and PPI Study showed that investment
management fees on mutual funds were pervasively higher than similar
fees that were the product of arm’s length bargaining.26 Both studies
attributed this difference to the structure of the mutual fund industry, which
involves external management of fund portfolios. Approximately fifty fee
cases were filed against the investment management industry because of
the Wharton Report.27 This was a major impetus for Congress to address
the issue of advisory fees.28
The PPI Study surveyed the litigation filed against investment
managers, concluded that investors were insufficiently protected by
existing law, and recommended that Congress impose a reasonableness
standard, enforceable in court.29 Congress was unwilling to do this but did
make advisers fiduciaries regarding fees and gave investors a private cause
of action enforceable in court.30
This section of the paper places the corporate waste standard in
context and presents the earliest available evidence on the level of sub-
advisory fees in the context of advisory fees and the institutional fees
presented in the Wharton Report and PPI Study.
III. SUB-ADVISORY FEES IN CONTEXT.
A. The Wharton Report
The Wharton Report found a heavy concentration of advisory fees on
open end mutual funds at the 0.5% or 50 basis point level.31 These mutual
funds were managed by external management firms and thus advisory fees
were not subject to competitive forces. The study also examined fee rates
26. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 4, at 493; PPI STUDY, supra note 5, at 115.
27. PPI STUDY, supra note 5, at 132.
28. Stewart Brown, Mutual Funds and the Regulatory Capture of the SEC, 19 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 701, at 714 (2017); see also 114 Cong. Rec. 23309 (statement of Mr. Brooke).
29. PPI STUDY, supra note 5, at 143.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2012).
31. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 4, at 484.
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charged to other clients of the investment management firms and rates
charged by mutual funds with internal management.32 Summary results of
those surveys are presented in the first two lines of Table 1:
The average portfolio size of the funds in the Wharton Report was
greater than $100 million.33 The study found that firms that charged their
mutual fund clients 0.5% or 50 basis points charged their non-fund clients
17.6 basis points for essentially the same services.34 This indicates that a
captive fund was charged 2.8 times more in fees than a fund with clients
who were in a position to negotiate fees. In other words, fees determined
by arm’s length bargaining amounted to about 35% of fee rates charged
captive funds.
Similarly, the study looked at mutual funds that were internally
managed, i.e., the funds hired the personnel who actually managed the
funds.35 The investment management costs of these funds averaged 18.7
32. The results of these surveys are presented in Tables VIII-42, WHARTON REPORT,
supra note 4, at 488, and VIII-40; Id. at 486. The presentation style is somewhat confusing
in that they tabulate the number of firms in different fee ranges and asset level ranges.
However, by assuming fee and assets levels in the middle of each range it is possible to
calculate a weighted average fee level for these two categories. The results of that
distillation are presented in Table 1.
33. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 4, at 78.
34. Id. at 489.
35. Id. at 441.
Table 1
Mutual Fund Advisory Fees Compared to Fees
Subject to Arm's Length Bargaining
1960-1967
Advisory
Fee Rates
Arm's
Length
Fee
Rates
Average
Portfolio
Size
Wharton Report 1960-Other Customers* 0.500% 0.176% $100+ mm
Wharton Report 1960-Internally Managed Funds** 0.500% 0.187% $100+ mm
PPI Report - 1965 Bank Advisory Rates 0.480% *** 0.062% $100 mm
PPI Report - 1965 Internally Managed Funds 0.480% *** 0.149% **** $100+ mm
Cohen Testimony - 1967 Sub-Advisory Fees 0.500% 0.114% $100 mm
* Distilled from Table VIII-42 on page of 488 of the Wharton Report
** Distilled from Table VIII-40 on page 486 of the Wharton Report
*** Median Fees: Page 104 of PPI Study
**** Weighted Average of Internally Managed Open-End Funds:Table III-5 on page 103 of PPI Study.
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basis points, which is about 37% of the fee rate level paid by customers of
externally managed funds.36
B. The PPI Study
The PPI Study found similar results. In the years since the Wharton
Report, median advisory fees had decreased slightly, to 48 basis points.37
The PPI Study attributed this to settlements resulting from approximately
fifty lawsuits that had been filed after the publication of the Wharton
Report.38 For comparison purposes, the SEC surveyed the fees of banks
offering investment management services to pension funds and other
clients and queried them for fees to manage a portfolio of $100 million.
Five of the six banks would manage $100 million for six basis points and
the sixth charged seven basis points.39 It follows that the average fee rate to
manage a $100 million portfolio was about 6.2 basis points as shown in
Table 1. Thus, the fee rate charged by banks to manage a $100 million
portfolio amounted to about 13% of the rate charged captive mutual fund
customers at the time. Similarly, the SEC surveyed fees on internally
managed funds and found average investment management costs of 14.9
basis points, about 31% of the rate charged customers of captive mutual
funds.40
C. Sub-Advisory Fee Rates
Neither the Wharton Report nor the PPI Study mentioned the level of
sub-advisory fees. SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen did so in his testimony
before congress in 1967.41 Mr. Cohen introduced a table into evidence
showing advisory and sub-advisory fee rates on about twenty mutual funds.
Of those, five had a flat 50 basis point advisory fee schedule and
corresponding sub-advisory fee schedules showing fee rates at different
levels of assets.42 Sub-advisory fee rates were calculated for those five
36. Id. at 484.
37. PPI STUDY, supra note 5, at 103-04.
38. Id. at 110.
39. Id. at 115.
40. Id. at 103.
41. Investment Company Act Amendments of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 9510 and
H.R. 9511, Pt. 1, 90th Cong. 197-99 (1967) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman,
Securities & Exchange Commission).
42. Id.
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funds based on the assumption that a $100 million portfolio was being
managed. The average sub-advisory fee rate under these assumptions was
11.4 basis points as presented in Table 1. Thus, average sub-advisory fee
rates to manage a $100 million portfolio amounted to about 23% of the rate
ultimately charged retail investors.
Similar to rates charged by banks and to other investment advisory
clients, sub-advisory fee rates are the product of arm’s length bargaining.
The evidence in Table 1 confirms that these rates are all roughly equivalent
and a fraction of the advisory fee rates charged retail mutual fund investors.
This is evidence of market forces at work where arm’s length bargaining is
extant and absent where it is not.
When funds are sub-advised, investment advisor profits on the
advisory function are the difference between the rate charged retail
investors and the rate at which the investment advisor can purchase
investment sub-advisory services in the open market.43 Thus, investment
advisors are incentivized to negotiate the lowest rate possible on sub-
advised funds to maximize their profits.
Profit margin is one measure of profitability. It is calculated as profit
(revenue minus costs) divided by revenue. For the sub-advised funds in
Table 1, revenue is 50 basis points times $100 million, or $500,000, and
costs are 11.4 basis points times $100 million, or $114,000. Thus, profit is
$386,000, or 77% of revenue. The investment advisor’s job is to pick
stocks for his mutual fund clients. An investment advisor who subcontracts
this activity to another firm earns a 77% profit in the transaction. Because
investment management firms are fiduciaries with respect to fees charged
to mutual fund investors, the fairness or lack thereof of a 77% profit margin
is the essence of advisory fee cases. Time and again courts, using the
Gartenberg standard, have found such arrangement to be fair and not in
violation of fiduciary standards.44
43. This statement is not strictly true as there may be some small additional costs to the
adviser that reduce profit margins slightly. These costs are explored below but the main
point of the example is not changed by these small amounts. Also, technically dollar profits
are the product of average assets under management and the difference between advisory
and sub-advisory fee rates.
44. See, e.g., Kasilag v. Hartford Inv. Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 11-1083, 2017 WL 773880
(D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d, No. 17-1653, 2018 WL 3913102 (3d Cir. Aug. 15, 2018)
(holding that the investment management fees paid to the funds’ administrators were not
excessive and within an arm’s-length transaction); Sivolella v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co.,
No. 11-cv-4194 (PGS)(DEA), 2016 WL 4487857 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2016), aff’d, No. 16-
4241, 2018 WL 3359108 (3d Cir. July 10, 2018) (holding that burden of proof on
Petitioner’s § 36(b) claim was not proven); Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 875 F.2d 404
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 919 (1989) (finding that investment management fees were
2019] MUTUAL FUND ADVISORY FEES 487
D. The Corporate Waste Standard.
The SEC, in the PPI Study and in testimony by Chairman Cohen,
highlighted the failure of the legal system to protect fund investors from
high fees resulting from the conflict of interest inherent in the structure of
the mutual fund industry. The PPI Study revealed more than 50 lawsuits
brought by fund shareholders in state and federal courts. Most of these
litigations were terminated through settlements providing for future
reductions in advisory fee rates.45 However, three cases were brought to
trial and the investment management industry prevailed in all three of these
cases.46 Most notable of these is the decision of the Delaware Court of
Chancery in Saxe v. Brady47 in which, as the PPI Study noted,48
The court observed that “based on the 1959 and 1960 figures the
profits are certainly approaching the point where they are
outstripping any reasonable relationship to expenses and effort
even in a legal sense.” The court apparently recognized that the
defendants had a duty to deal fairly with the fund and that the
burden of proving fairness normally would be on the defendants.
It held, however, that because the fund’s shareholders had
ratified the advisory contract, the defendants were relieved of the
burden of showing fairness and the plaintiff had to bear the
burden of proving affirmatively that the fees were so excessive as
to constitute a “waste” of corporate assets.
As the court put it:
When the shareholders ratify a transaction, the interested parties
are relieved of the burden of proving the fairness of the
transaction. The burden then falls on the objecting stockholders
to convince the court that no person of ordinary, sound business
judgment would be expected to entertain the view that the
consideration was a fair exchange for the value which was given.
Thus, under the standard prevailing at the time, fund shareholders had
not disproportionately large); Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, Inc., 663 F. Supp.
962 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 835 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, (holding a jury trial
shouldn’t be automatic just because the plaintiff designated the relief she sought as
“damages”); Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 974 (D. Minn. 2007) (holding
the shareholders did receive a “material benefit” from services by the Defendants to justify
the investment management fees paid).
45. PPI STUDY, supra note 5, at 132-33.
46. Id. at 133.
47. 184 A.2d 602 (Del. Ch. 1962).
48. PPI STUDY, supra note 5, at 135 (citations omitted).
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an unduly high burden to overcome in order to prevail in advisory fee
cases.
IV. THE LEAD UP TO THE 1970 AMENDMENTS TO THE
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT
In the three years leading up to passage of the 1970 amendments to
the ICA, Congress debated what standard should be adopted to replace the
“corporate waste” standard exemplified by the decision in Saxe v. Brady.49
Bills introduced in the House in 196750 and the Senate in 196851 adopted
the SEC’s “reasonableness” standard. These bills failed to pass. Following
discussions among the important House and Senate committees, the SEC,
and the Investment Company Institute, the 1970 amendments to the ICA
gave investors a private right of action, but removed the “reasonableness”
standard opposed by the ICI, instead making investment advisers
fiduciaries with respect to fees and retaining the provision in the 1940 ICA
that placed the burden of proof on the investor.52
What seems clear is that the Senate intended for the traditional
fiduciary standard to apply and to result in fair fees for investors, as was
explained during an Executive Session of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency at the request of the Chairman:
Mr. Paradise. Last year’s bill had a section in it and the bill that
was introduced this year that management fees would be
reasonable. Now, the SEC and the mutual fund industry has
gotten together and what they have really done is put the words
“fiduciary duty” in the place of reasonable. The meaning of
“fiduciary duty” would be fair, which is the way I see it is
practically equivocal to reasonable.
The mutual fund industry said they wanted the “fiduciary duty”
in there because it had a more definite meaning in law. That is
the big difference. All shareholders would have the right to sue
for a breach of fiduciary duty as well as the SEC under this
49. INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1969, S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 3 (1969).
50. See H.R. 9510 § 8(d), 90th Cong. (1967) (setting forth factors to consider in
determining the reasonableness of the compensation).
51. S. 3724, § 8 (90th Cong. 1968).
52. See Investment Company Amendment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 35(b), 84
Stat. 1413 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2012)) (explaining that
investment advisors are deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to compensation for
their services).
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proposal. The courts would give some consideration to the
approval of the fund’s board of directors of the fee and the
shareholder ratification would also be considered, but it still
would not go back to the corporate waste structure which has
always been the problem in shareholders suing [sic].53
The language of the Senate Report is consistent with the above
interpretation:
Because of the unique structure of this industry . . . the forces of
arm’s length bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry
in the same manner as they do in other sectors of the American
economy. . . . [The provisions of the Investment Company
act]. . . did not provide any mechanism by which the fairness of
management contracts could be tested in court. Under general
rules of law, advisory contracts which are ratified by the
shareholders, or in some States approved by a vote of the
disinterested directors, may not be upset in the courts except
upon a showing of “corporate waste.” As one court put it, the fee
must “Shock the conscience of the court.” [Y]our committee
has decided that the standard of “corporate waste” is unduly
restrictive and recommends that it be changed. Last year, the
Senate passed S.3724 which contained a provision stating that
management fees should be “reasonable.” The House, however,
took no action on the bill. [Y]our committee has decided that
there is an adequate basis to delete the express statutory
requirement of “reasonableness,” and to substitute a different
method of testing management compensation. This bill states
that the mutual fund investment adviser has a specific “fiduciary
duty” in respect to management fee compensation. . . . It also, is
in accordance with the traditional function of the courts to
enforce such fiduciary duties in similar type relationships.54
Thus, from the plain language of the Senate Report, it seems that the
Senate was committed to the notion of fairness in advisory fees and that its
intention was to make fees fairer. There are indications in the 1970 Senate
and House Reports that the Committee assumed “traditional fiduciary
standards” for testing whether fiduciary duty would apply, and that it was
not necessary to establish a separate standard for the new statute.55
53. Executive Session of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency (May 14,
1969), 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 (statement of Stephen J. Paradise, Assistant Counsel to the
Committee).
54. S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5-7 (1969).
55. Id. at 2, 6; H. Rep. 91-1332, at 8 (1970).
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V. THE GARTENBERG STANDARD
In Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., a case filed against
a very large Merrill Lynch money market fund under § 36(b) of the 1970
Investment Company Act, the district court acknowledged that the proper
standard to gauge violations of fiduciary duty had been articulated in
Pepper v. Litton:
An examination of the case authorities also fails to illumine
precisely the path to be followed by the Court in weighing the
compensation of the investment adviser of a money market fund
under fiduciary standards. Only general concepts have been
articulated. The standard of fiduciary duty under Section 36(b)
“is concerned solely with fairness and equity.” “The essence of
the (fiduciary) test is whether or not under all the circumstances
the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain.”56
The district court chose to ignore the standard corporate fiduciary test
and based its decision on what it determined was fair and equitable. Judge
Pollack decided that the proper test of the fairness and equity of the no-bid
advisory fee contract being tested in Gartenberg was the comparative level
of other no-bid advisory fee contracts being offered at the same time:
The issue of fair compensation becomes ultimately a social or
philosophical-and hence a legislative question-when the fee is in
harmony with the broad and prevailing market choice available
to the investor, the price being paid is disclosed and the services
are satisfactorily performed and sufficient disclosure of the scope
of the enterprise, its requirements and performance is made to the
Fund’s directors and investors. As Mr. Justice Collins appositely
wrote many years ago in Heller v. Boylan: “[T]he particular
business before this Court is not the revamping of the social or
economic order.” There would seem to be no sense to seek to
limit by judicial fiat what is satisfactorily performed, sufficiently
disclosed and freely available elsewhere in the market place at
comparable charges, without penalties or restraint.57
On appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed with Judge Pollack’s
reasoning, affirming that the level of no-bid contracts in the “market” is not
a proper comparator for the fairness and equity of a particular fee:
56. 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1046-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citation omitted) (quoting Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07, 60 S.Ct. 238, 245-46, 84 L.Ed.2 281 (1939).
57. Id. at 1068 (quoting Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 669 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 263
Ap.Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1st Dep’t 1941).
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We disagree with the district court’s suggestions that the
principal factor to be considered in evaluating a fee’s fairness is
the price charged by other similar advisers to funds managed by
them, that the “price charged by advisers to those funds
establishes the free and open market level for fiduciary
compensation,” that the “market price . . . serves as a standard to
test the fairness of the investment advisory fee,” and that a fee is
fair if it “is in harmony with the broad and prevailing market
choice available to the investor,” Competition between money
market funds for shareholder business does not support an
inference that competition must therefore also exist between
adviser-managers for fund business. The former may be
vigorous even though the latter is virtually non-existent. Each is
governed by different forces. Reliance on prevailing industry
advisory fees will not satisfy § 36(b).58
Donald Langevoort has made a similar point regarding the decision of
the Second Circuit, although in a more delicate fashion:
The key case is Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management
Inc., which reads enigmatically to say the least, but in the end
takes a plainly pro-defendant approach. Plaintiffs challenged the
advisory fee paid to Merrill Lynch by its massive money market
fund as excessive. The district court dismissed on grounds that
fees approved by independent directors are valid if deemed fair
compared to fees charged by other advisers to similar funds.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that this was a foolish test. If the
industry remains dominated by conflicts of interest, then
excessive fees will be the norm, and the norm should then not be
made the benchmark for propriety (citation omitted).59
More recently, in Jones v. Harris Associates, the Supreme Court
agreed, saying that “courts should not rely too heavily on comparisons with
fees charged to mutual funds by other advisers. These comparisons are
problematic because these fees, like those challenged, may not be the
product of negotiations conducted at arm’s length.” 60
The Second Circuit in Gartenberg did not conclude that fees charged
58. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir.
1982) (citations omitted) (quoting Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.,
528 F.Supp. 1038, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
59. Donald J. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual
Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty,
83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1023-24 (2015) [hereinafter Langevoort, Private Litigation].
60. 559 U.S. 335, 350-51 (2010).
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by other funds were totally irrelevant, instead suggesting the “structure of
fees” 61 could be used to indicate the extent to which other funds were
sharing economies of scale in the form of breakpoints to the fee schedule.
We do not suggest that rates charged by other adviser-managers
to other similar funds are not a factor to be taken into account.
Indeed, to the extent that other managers have tended “to reduce
their effective charges as the fund grows in size,” the Senate
Committee noted that such a reduction represents “the best
industry practice [which] will provide a guide.” However, the
existence in most cases of an unseverable relationship between
the adviser-manager and the fund it services tends to weaken the
weight to be given to rates charged by advisers of other similar
funds.62
The language used by the Second Circuit in adopting the appropriate
test to be used by courts to determine whether the advisor-manager
breached its fiduciary duty is broken into two sections. First, the court sets
out a traditional version of the test:
In short, the legislative history of § 36(b) indicates that the
substitution of the term “fiduciary duty” for “reasonable,” while
possibly intended to modify the standard somewhat, was a more
semantical than substantive compromise, shifting the focus
slightly from the fund directors to the conduct of the investment
adviser-manager. As the district court and all parties seem to
recognize, the test is essentially whether the fee schedule
represents a charge within the range of what would have been
negotiated at arm’s-length in the light of all of the surrounding
circumstances. . . . The Senate recognized that as a practical
matter the usual arm’s length bargaining between strangers does
not occur between an adviser and the fund, stating: “Since a
typical fund is organized by its investment adviser which
provides it with almost all management services and because its
shares are bought by investors who rely on that service, a mutual
fund cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the
adviser. Therefore, the forces of arm’s-length bargaining do not
work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as they do
in other sectors of the American economy.”63
61. The structure of fees in this case refers to the existence and magnitude of
breakpoints of the fees structure of competitive funds.
62. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928 (citations omitted) (quoting S.Rep. No. 91-184, supra,
[1970] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4902).
63. Id. at 928 (emphasis added) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-184, supra, [1970] U.S. Code
2019] MUTUAL FUND ADVISORY FEES 493
Although the Second Circuit opinion states that the District Court and
the parties seem to recognize the appropriate test, the District Court did not
apply that test, instead using a test that involved only “fairness and
equity”64 and the generally recognized fiduciary standard articulated in
Pepper. The initial statement by the Second Circuit is consistent with the
Pepper standard. Like Pepper, it is clear that the standard involves a
comparison of the transaction in question to transactions involving arm’s
length negotiation. The notion of a “range of outcomes” carries a
mathematical connotation and recognizes that such comparators may be
objectively determinable, i.e., market transactions that are by definition the
product of arm’s length negotiation.
The Second Circuit, then however, stated: “To be guilty of a violation
of § 36(b), therefore, the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the
services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length
bargaining.”65 In this restatement of the standard, the Second Circuit
referenced the “range of arm’s length negotiation” standard associated with
the district court and Pepper but then articulates a much more restrictive
“disproportionately large” standard.66 The court uses the transition
“therefore,”67 but the transition is a non sequitur: There is no analysis or
reasoning to justify the reformulated and more extreme standard.
Moreover, unlike the initial standard, the standard as applied by subsequent
courts is totally subjective and divorced from any possibility of an
objective determination.
The restated standard involves a two-pronged test: the fee at issue
must be “so disproportionately large” and “could not have been the product
of arm’s- length bargaining.”68 As Lyman Johnson notes, “the court
illogically framed the first prong in a way that deviates from
‘reasonableness’ and seemed to require extremeness—’so
disproportionately large,’ not just ‘disproportionately large,’ and ‘no
reasonable relationship,’ not just ‘unreasonable.’”69
Johnson goes on to discuss the corporate fiduciary doctrine and the
relevance of the behavior of the fund’s trustees. He then suggests that the
Cong. & Ad. News at 4901).
64. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 528 F.Supp. 1038, 1047
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
65. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Johnson, Fresh Look, supra note 14, at 519.
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Second Circuit articulation of the standard may have just been “clumsy”:
Furthermore, given the court’s clear acknowledgement that a
reasonableness standard is appropriate, its phrase “so
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to
the services rendered” is either a verbose way to express a
reasonableness requirement or it wrongly introduces a stricter
requirement that contradicts the very reasonableness standard
that the court seemingly endorsed. The reading more consistent
with legislative history and the rest of the opinion is that the
court spoke clumsily.70
It seems unlikely that the appellate court spoke clumsily. As
discussed below, it is more likely that the court spoke purposefully. The
restated standard in practice is no different from the corporate waste
standard it replaced, an assessment with which Langevoort agrees:
This test resembles the state law test for corporate waste, even
though the legislative history behind section 36(b) explicitly
wanted something more than a waste test, (citation omitted)
signaling little promise of success on the merits. Obviously, the
court was uncomfortable getting more deeply into the business of
fee-setting on its own. . . . Since Gartenberg, predictably,
plaintiffs have fared poorly in their attacks on fees and 12b-l
plans, notwithstanding ample grounds for concern that both tend
toward excess industry-wide.71
In practice, courts have conflated the two standards and then have
applied the subjective Gartenberg standard.72 In the process, courts have
ignored the more precise and objective initial Gartenberg standard,
focusing instead on the subjective standard that follows the “therefore”
transition. It is reasonable to conclude that the initial standard should be as
applicable as the subjective standard routinely used by the courts. As will
70. Id. at 517-18.
71. Langevoort, Private Litigation, supra note 59, at 1024 (citations omitted). The
important question, unanswered at this point is why the judiciary choose this path. It came
down squarely on the side of the investment management industry and against the stated
wishes of the Congress. Professor Langevoort hints that judicial self-interest might be
involved.
72. For instance, in Jones the Supreme court conflated the two standards, omitting the
“therefore” in Gartenberg: “[T]he test is essentially whether the fee schedule represents a
charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s-length in light of all of
the surrounding circumstances . . . . [T]o be guilty of a violation of § 36(b), . . . the adviser
must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large it bears no reasonable relationship to the
services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s length bargaining.” Jones v.
Harris Assocs., 559 U.S. 335, 344 (2010).
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be demonstrated below, application of the initial standard can lead to
dramatically different conclusions regarding advisory fees.
The most powerful evidence plaintiffs can present in an advisory fee
case is to show that the advisory fee in question is higher than fees
determined by arm’s length bargaining. This was the essence of the
argument in the Wharton and PPI reports. Plaintiffs in Gartenberg
attempted to do this, but they were foiled by a clever investment
management industry strategy that involved bringing an anomalous fund to
trial in 1980, rather than settling the case.73 The fund at issue in
Gartenberg was a huge money market fund that was integrated into the
Merrill Lynch brokerage business. Merrill Lynch charged the money fund
for time brokers spent processing brokerage orders that also involved
money fund transactions. The district court disallowed the comparison of
advisory fees to pension fees because Merrill Lynch argued that there were
processing costs associated with servicing large numbers of brokerage
clients.
Processing costs in the advisory function are anomalous. For all but a
few funds in the 1970s and early 1980s, the costs of all interactions with
mutual fund investors were handled under separate contracts with the
fund’s transfer agent or distributor. This remains true today and has
enabled the investment management industry to perpetrate the myth that it
is more expensive to manage mutual fund than pension portfolios because
of the large numbers of mutual fund clients involved. The anomalous
processing costs clearly impacted the Second Circuit’s decision in
Gartenberg:
Our affirmance is not a holding that the fee contract between the
Fund and the Manager is fair and reasonable. We merely
conclude that on this record appellants failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence a breach of fiduciary duty.
Whether a violation of § 36(b) might be established through
more probative evidence of. . . the Broker’s processing costs. . .
must therefore remain a matter of speculation.74
It is difficult to reconcile the above language with the fiduciary
standard imposed by the court. In essence, the Second Circuit said, “We
don’t know if the fee is fair, but we think it appropriate to require future
plaintiffs to show that the fee is ‘so disproportionately large that it. . . could
73. This is discussed in detail in Brown, Some Analytical Clarity, supra note 22.
74. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 933 (2d Cir.
1982).
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not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.’”75
The processing cost myth persists and found its way into the Supreme
Court’s decision in Jones v. Harris Associates that endorsed the
Gartenberg standard:
[T]he Gartenberg court rejected a comparison between the fees
that the adviser in that case charged a money market fund and the
fees that it charged a pension fund. (noting the “[t]he nature and
extent of the services required by each type of fund differ
sharply”). Petitioners contend that such a comparison is
appropriate, but respondent disagrees. Since the Act requires
consideration of all relevant factors, we do not think that there
can be any categorical rule regarding the comparisons of the fees
charged different types of clients. Instead, courts may give such
comparisons the weight that they merit in light of the similarities
and differences between the services that the clients in question
require, but courts must be wary of inapt comparisons. (citations
omitted)76
The big difference between advisory fees and pension fees in
Gartenberg was the anomalous processing costs, although in practice there
may be other factors/costs that explain some of the differences.
Nonetheless, the cost differential for pension fees is far too small to explain
the disparity between advisory and pension fees.77 Moreover, many of the
differences are mooted when the plaintiff’s theory is that the adviser is
charging excess fees relative to sub-advisory fees where the large number
of clients involved is irrelevant. These issues are examined in detail below.
In Gartenberg, the Second Circuit enumerated six factors to be
considered when deciding whether a fee is excessive.78 One of these,
profitability of the fund to the adviser, was indeterminate in Gartenberg
because of the anomalous processing costs. Various estimates of the costs
yielded after tax profit margins ranging from negative to about 40%.79
75. Id. at 928.
76. Jones, 559 U.S. at 349-50.
77. Freeman, Brown and Pomerantz estimate the difference at about three basis points.
John P. Freeman, Stewart L. Brown & Steve Pomerantz, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New
Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 83, 109 n.90 (2008).
78. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928-30. As listed in Krinsk v. Fund Asset Management,
Inc., a subsequent Second Circuit opinion, these factors are (a) the nature and quality of
services provided to fund shareholders; (b) the profitability of the fund to the adviser-
manager; (c) fall-out benefits, (d) economies of scale; (e) comparative fee structures; and (f)
the independence and conscientiousness of the trustees. 875 F.2d 404, 409 (2d Cir. 1989).
79. Brown, Some Analytical Clarity, supra note 22, estimated the gross profit margin
exclusive of processing costs in Gartenberg at about 96%. The plaintiffs calculated the same
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Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, Inc.80 established what has
become a profit margin standard for subsequent fee cases. It is based on
the Gartenberg standard and the business judgment rule.81 The reasoning
of the case is questionable. Unlike Gartenberg, the money market fund in
Schuyt was not integrated into a brokerage firm and had no processing
costs. The court chose to ignore expert economic testimony because the
economic experts failed to analyze how the fund board negotiated the
advisory contract. The court also denied any comparison of the fund’s
advisory fee with fees charged institutional customers and accepted the
profit margin calculation of plaintiff’s expert of 77.3%. The subjectivity of
the Gartenberg standard was in full view in the decision:
While it cannot be denied that the Adviser earned a significant
profit from these services, it does not appear to the Court, in light
of all of the facts, that the fees charged by the Adviser were so
disproportionately large that they bore no reasonable relationship
to the services rendered and could not have been the product of
arms-length bargaining.82
The court, relying on the business judgment rule to justify its decision,
hedged its opinion somewhat in a footnote:
The Court wishes to make clear that it is not holding that a profit
margin of up to 77.3% can never be excessive. In fact, under
other circumstances, such a profit margin could very well be
excessive. For example, if advisory services being challenged
were not of the highest quality and if the directors were not so
obviously qualified, fully informed, and conscientious, a similar
fee structure could violate section 36(b). This Court is simply
holding that on the facts presented here, the fee schedules at issue
represent charges within the range of what would have been
negotiated at arms-length in the light of all of the surrounding
circumstances.83
In other words, merely the fact that the board was qualified, fully
informed and conscientious was adequate for the court to determine that a
gross profit margin. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 930-31.
80. 663 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y 1987).
81. See Eric D. Roiter, Disentangling Mutual Fund Governance from Corporate
Governance, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2016) (discussing how use of the business judgment
rule in the context of mutual fund governance should difference from its use in the corporate
governance context).
82. Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, Inc., 663 F.Supp. 962, 989 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
83. Id. at 989 n. 77.
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77.3% profit margin was appropriate. The Schuyt “profit margin standard”
is devoid of any analysis related to profit margins on arm’s length
transactions.
VI. ANALYSIS OF ADVISORY AND SUB-ADVISORY FEE DATA.
What is lacking in § 36(b) fee cases is a clear and clean comparison
with fees determined by arm’s length bargaining. The purpose of this
section is to provide such a comparison. It does so by looking at the
universe of a large homogeneous sample of mutual funds and comparing
level of advisory fees to the corresponding level of sub-advisory fees. The
rates charged on sub-advisory fees are a near perfect estimate of market
determined fees on investment advisory services. Sub-advisory fees
overcome the possible defects mentioned in Jones v. Harris where the
court cautioned against “inapt” comparisons to pension fees that are also
determined by arm’s length bargaining:
[T]here may be significant differences between the services
provided by an investment adviser to a mutual fund and those it
provides to a pension fund which are attributable to the greater
frequency of shareholder redemptions in a mutual fund, the
higher turnover of mutual fund assets, the more burdensome
regulatory and legal obligations, and higher marketing costs.84
Of the factors mentioned, none apply to sub-advisory fees although
defendants in sub-advisory fee cases do document some small differences
in costs. These will be examined and estimated for an actual case in the
next section of this paper. For now, it does no great violence to the
analysis to assume that the investment advisory services provided by the
sub-advisor are identical to the services provided by the advisor.
Morningstar is a company that collects, collates and analyzes the
universe of mutual funds available in the United States and world-wide. As
part of the analysis, Morningstar categorizes mutual funds by the types of
securities invested in and the strategies followed. The largest single
Morningstar Category as measured by total assets under management is
that category of mutual funds that limit their choices of investments to
large capitalization stocks.85 As of December 2017, there was about $4.9
84. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 559 U.S. 335, 350 (2010).
85. The capitalization of a company is measured by multiplying the number of common
shares of stock it has outstanding in the market times the market price of those shares.
Large capitalization stocks are typically defined as those with at least $10 billion in market
value.
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trillion in about 4,000 fund classes invested in mutual funds categorized as
“large cap.”
The procedure used here was to access the Morningstar Direct
database, identify and analyze the universe of actively managed large cap
mutual funds, and download and cull the universe of all large cap funds.
About $1.8 trillion of large cap funds are index funds86 that were
eliminated, as were enhanced index funds and fund of funds. The
remaining funds represent the universe of actively managed large
capitalization mutual funds. About 3600 fund classes were then distilled
into individual and discrete mutual funds. The results of that process and
analysis is presented in Table 2.
In December 2017, the 986 actively managed large cap mutual funds
had total assets of just over $3 trillion. The average fund had just over $3
billion in assets under management and carried a weighted average
advisory fee of 0.478% or 47.8 basis points.87 The simple average advisory
fee for these funds was 66 basis points or almost 40% higher.
The reason for the difference between weighted and simple average
advisory fees is not difficult to identify. There are few very large funds and
many small funds. As funds grow they are forced to add breakpoints into
their advisory fees schedules so as not to exceed the judicially recognized
86. The biggest single category of index funds invest in S&P 500 stocks and these are
large cap funds.
87. The Morningstar database contains numbers for both “Management Fees” and
“Advisory Fees.” Morningstar defines management fees as the “most recently reported
actual percentage fees deducted from average net assets” and advisory fees as the “amount
charged by managers as represented in the fund’s annual report.” In practice these reported
numbers are usually identical or very close and averages are within small fraction of a basis
point. In a very few cases there is a substantial reported difference between these two
categories. This paper only presents evidence on advisory fees, but an analysis of
management fees yields essentially identical results.
Table 2
Analysis of Advisory and Sub-Advisory Fees of Actively Managed Large Capitalization Mutual Funds - December 2017
Total Assets Count
Average Fund
Size
Weighted
Average
Advisory
Fees
Weighted
Average
Sub-
Advisory
Fees
Simple
Average
Advisory
Fees
Simple
Average
Sub-
Advisory
Fees
All funds 3,027,466,890,501 986 3,070,453,236 0.478 0.660
All Sub Advised Funds 751,621,424,681 278 2,703,674,190 0.485 0.209 0.632 0.282
All Non-Sub-Advised Funds 2,288,437,480,422 711 3,218,618,116 0.476 0.671
Subsidiary Sub-Advised Funds 128,569,581,725 33 3,896,047,931 0.570 0.315 0.590 0.310
Co-Branded Sub-Advised Funds 63,672,953,467 71 896,802,162 0.654 0.360 0.684 0.355
Independently Sub-Advised Funds 559,378,889,489 174 3,214,821,204 0.446 0.167 0.618 0.244
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profit margin maximum of about 77%. Thus, large funds, those with high
levels of assets under management and lower advisory fees, dominate the
asset weighted averages but have far less impact on simple average
advisory fees.
Average advisory fees have increased over the years despite large
increases in assets. In 1965, when the SEC published the PPI Study, total
mutual fund industry assets were about $35 billion, median advisory fees
were 48 basis points, and average fees were 45 basis points.88 In the fifty
or so years between 1965 and 2017 total industry actively managed assets
increased to about $9.5 trillion by 2015.89
At the end of 2017, there was about $750 billion in large cap funds
that were sub-advised, comprising about 25% of all actively managed large
cap assets. The sub-advised funds were slightly smaller than the overall
average. The 278 sub-advised funds averaged about $2.7 billion or about
90% of the size of the overall average. Unsurprisingly, because of their
smaller size, these funds had higher weighted average advisory fees of 48.5
basis points. The weighted average sub-advisory fee amounted to 20.9
basis points, less than half of the advisory fee level on the same funds.
However, as will be discussed below, this fee level is not indicative of the
level of sub-advisory fees determined by arm’s length bargaining because
some of the sample is corrupted and un-representative.
The 711 non-sub-advised funds had about $2.3 trillion of large cap
assets in December 2017. Excluding the sub-advised funds increased the
average fund size of this group to about $3.2 billion and decreased the
weighted average advisory fee slightly to 47.6 basis points.
The bottom three lines of Table 2 subdivide the sub-advised funds into
three categories. In the first category there are about $129 billion in assets
sub-advised by subsidiaries of the fund advisor as indicated by the name of
the sub-advisor being clearly associated with the advisor.90 Thirty-three
funds were so identified, which resulted in an average fund size larger than
88. Brown & Pomerantz, Some Clarity, supra note 15, at 787.
89. Id.; Although the funds in the PPI Study included other than large cap funds and are
not completely comparable, average fees between then and 2015 increased about 45% in an
industry generally acknowledged to exhibit economies of scale. Normally, an increase in
assets is associated with a decrease in advisory fees.
90. An advisor is not permitted to enter into a sub-advisory agreement without
shareholder approval. However, SEC staff has sometimes granted exemptive relief when
the new arrangement did not materially change the terms of a previously approved
agreement. See Gregory C. Davis et al., Mutual Fund Use of Sub-Advisers [July 6, 2015], in
MUTUAL FUNDS AND EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS REGULATION § 42:2.2 (Clifford E. Kirsch
ed., 2018).
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the average non-sub-advised fund of about $3.9 billion. The weighted
average advisory fee was 57 basis points, significantly greater than the
average of the non-sub-advised funds or 47.6 basis points.
A fund that is sub-advised by a subsidiary obviously does not
establish the sub-advisory fee based on arm’s length bargaining because it
would essentially be negotiating with itself, as is indicated by an above
average weighted sub-advisory fee of 31.5 basis points. This category of
fund is thus excluded from inclusion in the estimates of sub-advisory fees
that follow.
One must, however, ask how it is that such large funds ($3.9 billion on
average) can get away with charging such high fees. It should be expected
that larger funds would be forced to lower fees because of the profit margin
maximums enshrined in Schuyt. The answer is simple. Courts have
allowed sub-advisory fees as a legitimate expense in calculating profit
margins.91 If a large fund can legally charge inflated sub-advisory fees as a
legitimate expense, it can artificially reduce profit margins and charge
higher advisory fees. Although this account involves some speculation, it
is hard to think of an alternative explanation.
Some mutual funds are co-branded with a sub-advisor. The sub-
advisor is named or branded in the title of the mutual fund, as, for example,
the Nuveen Santa Barbara Dividend Growth Fund for which Nuveen is the
investment manager and Santa Barbara Asset Management the sub-advisor.
Typically, co-branding occurs when the advisor does not have the
infrastructure/internal talent to manage a particular style of fund. Over the
years, Nuveen has specialized in fixed income management and the fund
sub-advised by Santa Barbara is an equity fund. The seventy-one co-
branded funds were quite small, with, on average, $896 million in assets,
weighted average advisory fees of 65.4 basis points, and sub-advisory fees
of 36 basis points. It is to be expected that sub-advisors would demand to
be compensated for lending their names to the titles of co-branded funds.
For that reason, the 36 basis point sub-advisory fees are probably inflated
and not representative of a true arm’s length negotiation based solely on
investment advisory services.
91. See, e.g., Zehrer v. Harbor Capital Advisors, Inc., No. 14 C 00789, 2018 WL
1293230, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2018) (acknowledging that mutual fund profitability
reporting is required by GAAP); Kasilag v. Hartford Inv. Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 11-1083,
2017 WL 773880 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d, No. 17-1653, 2018 WL 3913102 (3d Cir.
Aug. 15, 2018) (holding that profitability is inclusive of the sub-advisor’s fees); Sivolella v.
AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. 11 C 4194, 2016 WL 4487857, at *50-51 (D.N.J. Aug. 25,
2016) (finding that the classification of sub-advisor fees as expenses is an acceptable
accounting treatment).
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Excluding the first two categories leaves those sub-advised funds
whose fees are determined by arm’s length bargaining because the advisor
and sub-advisor are independent of each other. The 174 such funds
average about $3.2 billion in assets under management. Weighted average
advisory and sub-advisory fees are 44.6 and 16.7 basis points, respectively.
Weighted averages are useful when it is necessary to assign more
importance to certain categories, such as, in the present case, assets under
management. Weighted average advisory and sub-advisory fees assign
greater importance to a fund’s fee if it is based on higher levels of assets.
Simple or arithmetic averages, on the other hand, assign equal values to
each fund, whether large or small. Simple averages are a measure of
central tendency and are calculated by adding up all the values and dividing
by the sample size. In Table 2 there are large differences between
weighted and simple average fees because there are a relatively small
number of large funds and large numbers of small sized funds. Because
large funds typically involve lower fee levels, weighted average fees are
lower than simple or arithmetic average fees.
It is useful to step back and take a high-altitude view of the numbers
in Table 2. When an investment advisor hires a sub-advisor it essentially
sub-contracts its core business function, portfolio management, to a
subcontractor and profits by the difference between the advisory and sub-
advisory fees. The manager has certain duties and responsibilities that may
entail some costs. For now, assume that those costs are zero or very small.
Weighted average advisory fees for all actively managed large cap funds in
Table 2 are 0.478% or 47.8 basis points and the weighted average sub-
advisory fee is 16.7 basis points. In other words, absent other costs, the
investment manager marked up the sub-advisory fee about 2.7 times on
average. That number is nearly identical when looking at simple average
advisory and sub-advisory fees. In other words, the baked in average profit
margin is about 65% (47.8-16.7)/47.8.
Based only on this information and assuming no significant additional
costs to investment advisors, it is useful to ask the question: Do the
advisory fees in Table 2 carry the earmarks of arm’s length negotiation?
An unbiased observer would have to answer no. Advisory fees are
significantly greater than fees known to be determined by arm’s length
bargaining. So, applying the traditional corporate standard test of fiduciary
duty, the average investment management fee violates fiduciary standards.
It is worth noting that sub-advisory fees are negotiated with for-profit firms
so that there is a normal profit margin/rate of return also baked into sub-
advisory fees.
While interesting, the data and analysis in Table 2 is somewhat
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distorted by the presence of so many small funds. Standard statistical
analysis assumes that variables of interest are normally distributed. A Chi
Square test for normality rejects the hypothesis that advisory fees in Table
2 are normally distributed but fails to reject the hypothesis that sub-
advisory fees are normally distributed. The reason that advisory fees do
not conform to normality is clear. There are far too many small funds with
large advisory fees. Examination of the 986 advisory fee data points in
Table 2 reveals that 248 of the 986 funds had assets under management of
less than $100 million and the total assets managed was just over $10
billion. So, 25% of the funds (248) have about 0.3% of the total assets of
actively managed large cap funds. About 36% (352 funds) had managed a
total of about $25 billion or less than 1% of total assets under management.
The presence of so many small funds adds unneeded complexity and
uncertainty to the analysis of the large funds typically involved in
litigation. For fairness and comparability purposes the funds in Table 2
were limited to funds with at least $1 billion in assets under management.
Under these assumptions, both advisory and sub-advisory fees conform to
normality assumptions. The results of that analysis are presented in Panel
A of Table 3.
The first thing to note about Panel A is that the level of total assets
under analysis has decreased 5.2% from about $3 trillion to $2.87 trillion
after the analysis eliminated 618 small funds, or a 62% decrease. The
remaining funds, those with at least $1 billion of assets, caused the average
fund analyzed to increase from about $3 billion to about $7.7 billion. The
Table 3
Analysis of Advisory and Sub-Advisory Fees of Actively Managed
Large Capitalization Mutual Funds - December 2017
Panel A: All Large Capitalization Funds with Assets of at Least $1 billion
Assets > $1Billion Assets Count Average Fund Size
Weighted
Average
Advisory
Fees
Weighted
Average
Sub-
Advisory
Fees
Simple
Average
Advisory
Fees
Simple
Average
Sub-
Advisory
Fees
Standard
Deviation
of
Advisory
Fees
Standard
Deviation
of Sub-
Advisory
Fees
All funds 2,869,534,504,324 373 7,693,121,996 0.462 0.552 0.182
All Sub Advised Funds 686,675,920,753 111 6,186,269,556 0.468 0.202 0.556 0.243 0.153 0.155
All Non-Sub-Advised Funds 2,182,858,583,571 262 8,331,521,311 0.460 0.551 0.193
Subsidiary Sub-Advised Funds 125,652,161,471 20 6,282,608,074 0.572 0.316 0.593 0.342 0.115 0.206
Co-Branded Sub-Advised Funds 45,491,493,414 17 2,675,970,201 0.619 0.371 0.645 0.358 0.128 0.128
Independently Sub-Advised Funds 515,532,265,868 74 6,966,652,241 0.429 0.159 0.525 0.189 0.193 0.113
Upper Confidence Interval .189 + 2(.113) = 0.416
Panel B: Analysis of Funds Above and Below 95% Upper Confidence Interval of Sub-Advisory Fees
Assets > $1Billion
% of
Count
% of
Assets Assets Count
Average Fund Size
Weighted
Average
Advisory
Fees
Simple
Average
Advisory
Fees
Advisory Fee <=.416 22.5% 40.8% 1,171,492,393,336 84 13,946,338,016 0.285 0.316
Advisory Fee > .416 77.5% 59.2% 1,698,042,110,988 289 5,875,578,239 0.584 0.623
Totals 100% 100% 2,869,534,504,324 373 7,693,121,996 0.462 0.552
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impact on weighted average advisory fees was minimal, dropping from
47.8 to 46.2 basis points. The impact on simple average fees was
somewhat more pronounced, dropping from 66 to 55.2 basis points.
Overall weighted average sub-advisory fees dropped slightly from 20.9 to
20.2 basis points. Simple average sub-advisory fee fell from 24.4 basis
points to 18.9 basis points for independently sub-advised funds.
It is inappropriate to apply standard statistical analysis to weighted
averages as this violates required normality assumptions. Accordingly, in
the analysis that follows only simple averages will be used. The
differences between weighted and simple averages of advisory and sub-
advisory fees were much reduced when small funds were eliminated from
the analysis.
The calculation of simple average sub-advisory fees and the
corresponding standard deviation enable the application of a statistical test
conforming to the initial objective Gartenberg standard, i.e., whether the
fee in question is outside of the range of fees determined by arm’s length
bargaining. The confidence interval, or the 95% confidence interval, is a
common statistical tool that conforms very closely to this insight.92 When
variables are normally distributed, 95% of all observations will fall within
plus or minus two standard deviations of the arithmetic or simple average
of the sample.
As can be observed in Table 3, simple average sub-advisory fees on
independently sub-advised funds were 18.9 basis points with a standard
deviation of 11.3 basis points. Thus, the upper 95% confidence limit is
18.9 plus two times 11.3 or 41.6 basis points. Funds with fees falling
above this limit have advisory fees outside of the range of fees determined
by arm’s length bargaining and, at minimum, should be investigated
further. Because simple average advisory fees are about 55 basis points,
there is reason to believe93 that more than half of all actively managed large
92. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Lost in Translation: Statistical Inference in Court, 46
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1068 (2014) (“A confidence interval is defined as a range of possible
(relative risk) values at a given significance level (P-value). A 95% confidence interval
means that, over a vast number of repetitions, 95% of the intervals generated would contain
the true association if the model were correct. If the model used to compute the confidence
interval is correct, the data and the model provide more support for data points inside the
limits of the interval than outside. A relative risk of one within the confidence interval does
not mean there is no association, because confidence intervals include a range of values. If,
for example, we have a 95% CI [1-10], the interval includes the relative risk of one, but it
also includes the relative risk of ten. Thus the relative risk is as likely to be ten as it is
one.”) (citations omitted).
93. When variables are normally distributed, half of the observations will fall below the
mean and half above the mean. Because the mean advisory fee is 55 basis points and the
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cap funds have advisory fees outside of the range of arm’s length
bargaining. This is shown to be the case in Panel B of Table 3.
In Panel B, the 373 actively managed funds with at least $1 billion of
assets under management are split into two groups, those with fees below
the 95% confidence limit of sub-advisory fees and those above the limit. In
Panel B, 289 of the 373 funds or 77% had advisory fees greater than the
95% confidence limit of sub-advisory fees. These funds had total assets of
$1.7 trillion or 59% of the assets of all actively managed large cap funds
with assets of at least $1 billion. The simple average advisory fee on these
funds was 62.3 basis points, versus 31.6 basis points for funds with fees
below the 95% confidence limit. Weighted average fees were 58.4 versus
28.5 for the corresponding groupings.
Funds with advisory fees below the 95% confidence limit were larger
on average than those above the limit; $14 billion versus $5.9 billion. The
average level of assets under management was about $7.7 billion. The
difference in the average size of the funds in the two groups may explain
some of the difference in fees as larger funds typically have lower fees.
This argues against a mechanical application of the standard. A more
precise application would involve the comparison of fees of funds with
similar levels of assets under management.94
It is possible to draw some tentative conclusions from the above
analysis. It is reasonable to ask if the fee being litigated is outside of the
range of fees determined by arm’s length negotiation. Application of the
statistical test implied by this standard strongly suggests that a very large
proportion of the funds in question fall outside of this range. This implies
that Professor Johnson’s observation that something is amiss with § 36(b)
is strongly supported by the analysis. Under the currently applied standard,
no investment manager has ever been shown to have charged excess fees.
Under the objective standard developed here, a large proportion of large
cap advisory fees would fall outside the range of fees determined by arm’s
length bargaining.
VII. JONES V. HARRIS AND ITS AFTERMATH
When an opportunity arose, the Supreme Court, in the face of
upper confidence limit is 42 basis points, more than half of the funds have advisory fees
greater than 42 basis points.
94. A more refined analysis involving a regression of sub-advisory fees on the level of
assets could be conducted. The resultant standard error of the regression would allow for
the calculation of a confidence interval at different levels of assets.
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evidence that competition had not imposed discipline on advisory fees,
continued the judiciary’s bias against plaintiffs in § 36(b) cases. A Seventh
Circuit panel, using research by Coates and Hubbard95 that was partially
sponsored by the Investment Company Institute96 held that the Gartenberg
standard was obsolete because competition imposes discipline on advisory
fees. However, the notion that competition imposes discipline on advisory
fees has been effectively debunked by recent research showing, inter alia,
that advisory fees are insensitive to massive increases in assets levels and
that investment advisory firms earn economic profits for owners.97
The full court denied rehearing, but five judges, led by Judge Posner,
dissented,
The panel bases its rejection of Gartenberg mainly on an
economic analysis that is ripe for reexamination on the basis of
growing indications that executive compensation in large
publicly traded firms often is excessive because of the feeble
incentives of boards of directors to police compensation.98
The dissent cited considerable research, including that by Freeman
and Brown,99 who showed that mutual fund investment advisory fees are
roughly double comparable pension fees that are determined by arm’s
length bargaining, and concerns about mutual fund corporate governance.
Judge Posner’s dissent also referenced research by Camelia
Kuhnen,100 who questioned the independence of independent directors.
Johnson has summarized Kuhnen’s research:
Professor Kuhnen found that business connections— specifically
the number of times fund directors have sat on boards of any
other funds managed by the adviser and a related measure of
connectivity between the adviser and a potential new
subadviser—foster favoritism in dealings between fund directors
and advisers to the detriment of investors. She found that when
mutual funds select subadvisory firms to help the primary adviser
manage the fund, the greater the connection between such firms
and fund directors through past business relationships, the more
likely they are to win the management contract. Moreover, the
more connected subadvisers and fund directors are, the lower the
95. See generally John C. Coates & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual
Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151 (2007).
96. Asher Hawkins, Well-Funded Opinion, FORBES, May 25, 2009, at 28.
97. Brown & Pomerantz, Some Clarity, supra note 15, at 767.
98. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2008).
99. Freeman & Brown, Mutual Fund Fee Litigation, supra note 15, at 638.
100. Jones, 537 F.3d at 730.
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net and risk-adjusted rates of return. Past business connections
also play a role in an adviser’s selection of directors to serve on
new funds sponsored by the adviser. In addition, Professor
Kuhnen found that business connections are positive predictors
of expense ratios and advisory fees. She also concluded that all
measures of business connections are significant negative
predictors of the amount of expenses the advisor reimburses to
the fund.101
Kuhnen’s research is consistent with the insights and opinions of
many scholars, experts, and judges, as well as with the implications of this
paper. SEC Chairman Cohen, an unconflicted public servant attempting to
act in the public interest, opined, for example, that it is a myth that
unaffiliated directors serve as an effective control over advisory fees.102
Two noteworthy industry insiders have also commented on the
general failure of mutual fund boards to fulfill their responsibilities under
the ICA. Jack Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Group, made the following
comment:
Well, fund directors are, or at least to a very major extent, sort of
a bad joke. They’ve watched industry fees go up year after year,
they’ve added 12b-1 fees. I think they’ve forgotten, maybe
they’ve never been told, that the law, the Investment Company
Act, says they’re required to put the interest of the fund
shareholders ahead of the interest of the fund adviser. It’s simply
impossible for me to see how they could have ever measured up
to that mandate, or are measuring up to it.103
Warren Buffett, famous investor and chairman of Berkshire
Hathaway, once made the following comment:
I think independent directors have been anything but
independent. The Investment Company Act, in 1940, made these
provisions for independent directors on the theory that they
would be the watchdogs for all these people pooling their money.
101. Johnson, Fresh Look, supra note 14, at 514.
102. See Investment Company Act Amendments of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 9510
and H.R. 9511, Pt. 1, 90th Cong. 46 (1967) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman,
Securities & Exchange Commission) (“the industry insists on propagating the myth that
unaffiliated directors have served as an effective control over advisory fees. . . . These
statements, however, are flatly contradicted by the sworn testimony of the directors of the
largest mutual fund”).
103. Amended Complaint Under Investment Company Act of 1940 at 22, Gallus v.
Ameriprise Fin., Inc., No. 04-cv-04498 (D. Minn. 2006).
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The behavior of independent directors in aggregate since 1940
has been to rubber stamp every deal that’s come along from
management—whether management was good, bad, or
indifferent. Not negotiate for fee reductions and so on. A long
time ago, an attorney said that in selecting directors, the
management companies were looking for Cocker Spaniels and
not Dobermans. I’d say they found a lot of Cocker Spaniels out
there.104
Others are also skeptical of the efficacy of fund governance.105
Palmiter argued that fund independent directors:
[a]pprove fund transactions with the management firm and
ensure compliance with the 1940 Act and implementing SEC
rules. Fund directors thus function as outsourced regulators, with
their selection and compensation in the hands of the management
firm they supervise. . . . Fund boards have been weak and even
feckless protectors of fund investors. . . .106
Birdthistle found evidence of decisions made by the investment
management industry, such as market-timing, portfolio valuation, and late
trading that increased investment advisor profits while costing investors
billions of dollars.107
A decade ago, one District Court excoriated independent directors for
engaging in “an elaborate exercise in checking off boxes and papering the
file,” instead of seeking to obtain “the best possible deal for investors.”108
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs lost the case. Plaintiffs consistently lose such
104. Haywood Kelly, A Quick Q & A with Warren Buffett, Morningstar (May 6, 1998);
cited in Strougo v. BEA Assoc., 188 F. Supp.2d 373, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
105. See David J. Carter, Mutual Fund Boards and Shareholder Action, 3 VILL. J.L. &
INV. MGMT. 6 (2002) (questioning the theoretical viability of fund governance due to a
belief that the interests of independent mutual fund directors may be closely aligned with
those of interested directors); John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory
Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609 (2001) (arguing that interests of a
fund’s board are aligned with the investment adviser, rather than the shareholders); Johnson,
Fresh Look, supra note 14 (sharing inconclusive empirical evidence on the relationship
between mutual fund director independence and mutual fund advisory fees); Eric D. Roiter,
Disentangling Mutual Fund Governance from Corporate Governance, 6 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 1 (2016) (arguing that fundamental differences between mutual funds and corporations
necessitate a disentanglement of mutual fund governance from corporate governance).
106. Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Board: A Failed Experiment in Regulatory
Outsourcing, 1 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 165, 165 (2006).
107. William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in
the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1451-60 (2006).
108. In re Am. Mut. Funds Fee Litig., No. 04-5993, 2009 WL 5215755, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 28, 2009).
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cases, because checking boxes and papering the file “is what controlling
case law and SEC regulations demand, and is sufficient to immunize
Defendants against § 36(b) liability so long as the fees charged are not
grossly out of line with the range of fees charged in the industry.”109
In Jones, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve a split among the
Circuit Courts of Appeal as to the proper standard under § 36(b) for
determining if a breach of fiduciary duty had occurred. The Supreme Court
found itself on the horns of a dilemma not dissimilar to the binary choice
faced by the Gartenberg courts. To resolve the conflicting arguments
among, first, the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuit, supporting the
Gartenberg standard, second, Judge Easterbrook and four other Seventh
Circuit judges, who would adopt a different standard, and third, Judge
Posner of the Seventh Circuit who questioned Gartenberg, but on different
grounds, it faced an unpalatable choice. If it ruled with Judge Easterbrook,
whose opinion was based on questionable research, it would have blown
away the Gartenberg standard with serious but unknown consequences. If
it ruled with Judge Posner, it was sure to unleash a flood of litigation.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court embraced the status quo and retained the
Gartenberg standard:
The Gartenberg standard. . . may lack sharp analytical clarity,
but we believe that it accurately reflects the compromise that is
embodied in §36(b), and it has provided a workable standard for
nearly three decades. The debate. . . regarding today’s mutual
fund market is a matter for Congress, not the courts.110
This statement is disingenuous and revealing. As discussed above, the
“compromise” was essentially a sell out to the ICI and the “workable
standard” comment belies the voluminous evidence that something is amiss
with § 36(b). Suggesting that the problem is one to be handled by
Congress makes explicit the refusal of the judiciary to get involved in
mutual fund advisory fee matters. Moreover, in rationalizing this decision,
the Supreme Court was forced to embrace the Gartenberg standard and
ignore Judge Posner’s considerations regarding mutual fund corporate
governance:
Congress rejected a “reasonableness” requirement that was
criticized as charging the courts with rate-setting
responsibilities. . . . Congress’ approach recognizes that courts
are not well suited to make such precise calculations.
109. Id.
110. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 559 U.S. 335, 353 (2010).
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Gartenberg’s “so disproportionately large” standard, 694 F. 2d,
at 928, reflects this congressional choice to “rely largely upon
[independent director] ‘watchdogs’ to protect shareholders
interests.”111
There is much to unpack in the above statement. First, Congress
thought that a fiduciary standard was equivalent to a reasonableness
requirement and the Second Circuit agreed with that. Thus, Congress did
not so much reject a reasonableness standard as recast it as a fiduciary
standard. It is incorrect to say that Congress rejected a reasonableness
requirement. It was and is the judiciary that rejected and continues to reject
a reasonableness requirement. It does so by embracing an extreme and
subjective fiduciary standard.
Second, the notion that courts are “unsuited” and “professionally
untrained” to determine a fair price reinforces Donald Langevoort’s insight
that the Gartenberg standard was purposefully extreme to relieve the
judicial system from having to make such determinations. Also, it is not
necessarily true that courts are unsuited to make such determinations. In
testimony before Congress in 1967, Judge Friendly, of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, opined:
I am glad to give the subcommittee such help as I can on the
limited question whether Congress should hesitate to enact a
[reasonableness] requirement. . . for fear that the courts could not
administer it properly. I think I can sum up my position by
saying that while the courts are not looking for any more
business, because we have plenty, and Congress keeps us well
occupied with new lines of business, I perceive no reason why
the courts could not effectively administer [a reasonableness
requirement] if Congress should decide that it wants us to do
so.112
Judge Friendly went on to illustrate several situations where courts
had effectively made such determinations. He also opined that uniformity
of decision among different courts was a consideration:
I would have to agree that if uniformity in standards as to the fees
of advisers of investment companies was the controlling
consideration, that would be better accomplished by requiring
111. Id. at 352-53.
112. Investment Company Act Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. on H.R.
9510 and H.R. 9511, Pt. 2, 90th Cong., 609 (1967) (statement of Judge Henry J. Friendly,
Second Circuit Court of Appeals).
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any complaint to be presented to the SEC for action, subject only
to the usual limited judicial review.113
Thus, Judge Friendly envisioned a role for the SEC in enforcing a
reasonableness standard as did the SEC itself.114
Finally, consider the last sentence from Jones quoted above:
Gartenberg’s “so disproportionately large” standard reflects a
congressional choice to “rely largely upon [independent director]
‘watchdogs’ to protect shareholders interests.” The sentence overstates
Congress’s intent. Although the Senate Report said that “this section is not
intended to authorize a court to substitute its business judgment for that of
the mutual fund’s board of directors in the area of management fees,”115
Congress was more circumspect in the actual language of the statute.
Section 35(b) states that a reviewing court should take into account fund
directors’ approval of an adviser’s management contract by “giving such
consideration. . . as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.”116
Thus, the Supreme Court overstated the case in asserting that Congress
intended for independent directors to be the principal protectors of
shareholder interests.
Langevoort argues that Burks was pivotal in reducing the level of
judicial scrutiny in breach of fiduciary duty cases.117 The Supreme Court
knew or should have known that the business judgment rule is highly
suspect, if for no other reason than that Judge Posner brought it to their
attention. Yet they chose to ignore Judge Posner’s concerns and the
inconvenient fact that independent directors are ultimately powerless to
influence fees because of the inseverable relationship of the fund with the
investment manager. By ducking the hard questions and embracing the
status quo, the Supreme Court was and is complicit in the systematic
overcharging of ninety million mutual fund investors.
As previously discussed, the Second Circuit in Gartenberg cautioned
against using the level of fees of similar funds to gauge the fees of a
specific funds or funds, although it is proper to look at the structure of fees,
i.e., breakpoints in the fee schedules of comparable funds as a measure of
113. Id. at 611.
114. See Investment Company Act Amendments of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 9510
and H.R. 9511, Pt. 1, 90th Cong. 44 (1967) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman,
Securities & Exchange Commission).
115. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1969, S. Rep. 91-184, at 7 (1969).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2) (2012).
117. Donald J. Langevoort, supra note 59, at 1017-19 (2015).
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sharing of economies of scale. Jones v. Harris reinforced that notion.118
That all changed, however, with Gallus v. Ameriprise Financial,
Inc.,119 a § 36(b) case decided by the Minnesota District Court and reversed
by the Eighth Circuit while Jones v. Harris Associates was pending before
the Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Jones v.
Harris Associates, it granted Ameriprise’s petition for certiorari, vacated
the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, and remanded for further consideration in
light of Jones.120 The District Court reinstated its earlier decision and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed.121
In the District Court, plaintiffs alleged that fees were excessive in
relation to fees determined at arm’s length, such as pension fees.122
Defendants admitted that the board of directors looked only at fees of
competitors’ funds in setting advisory fee rates because they wanted to be
“in the middle of the pack.”123 Although the Eighth Circuit in its post-
Jones decision recognized that “the Supreme Court also clarified that
comparisons between the fees that an adviser charges its institutional
clients and the fees it charges its mutual fund clients may be relevant,”124
the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to present additional
evidence that the fee was outside arm’s-length range that would allow
plaintiffs to survive a motion for summary judgment, as Jones requires.125
Since Gallus, it has become settled case law that “comparative fee
structure” means the level of fees of comparable funds, an issue that was
important in the much more recent case of Kasilag v. Hartford.
VIII. KASILAG V. HARTFORD
The most efficient manner to test the proposed objective fiduciary
standard is to apply it to an actual case and compare the implications to the
actual outcome. Kasilag v. Hartford is just such a case.126 This section of
118. 559 U.S. 335, 346-47 (2010).
119. Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (D. Minn. 2007), rev’d
and remanded on other grounds, 561 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 559 U.S. 1046 (2010), and order reinstated sub nom. Gallus v. Am. Exp. Fin.
Corp., 2010 WL 5137419 (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2010), aff’d, 675 F.3d 1173 (8th Cir. 2012).
120. Ameriprise Fin., Inc. v. Gallus, 559 U.S. 1046 (2010).
121. Gallus v. American Express Fin. Corp., No. 04–4498, 2010 WL 5137419 (D. Minn.
Dec. 10, 2010), aff’d, 675 F.3d 1173 (8th Cir. 2012).
122. Gallus, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 984.
123. Id. at 976.
124. Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 675 F.3d 1173, 1179 (8th Cir. 2012).
125. Id. at 1180-81.
126. Kasilag v. Hartford Inv. Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 11-1083, 2017 WL 773880 (D.N.J.
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the paper presents a synopsis of the facts in Kasilag, including a distillation
of the financial data presented in the case, applies the proposed objective
fiduciary standard to the facts and data of the case, and discusses the results
and implications.
Section 36(b) cases against investment managers involving sub-
advisory fees fall into two general categories: manager of manager cases
and reverse manager of manager cases.127 In manager of manager cases,
plaintiffs assert that sub-advisors are performing essentially all the
management services but receive only a fraction of the fee paid to the
manager. In reverse manager of manager cases plaintiffs assert that a
management fee is excessive because the manager charges substantially
lower fees to perform essentially identical services when sub-advising
funds for other investment managers. Kasilag was a manager of manager
case.128
Two of the Gartenberg factors, comparative fee structures and the
profitability of the funds to the advisor, are important to an understanding
of the decision in Kasilag. There was extensive evidence presented in the
case concerning comparative performance and costs with peer funds as
determined by Lipper Analytical.129 In general, it was revealed that the
Hartford funds were mediocre performers with unexceptional fees as
compared to peer funds.130
Fees charged by Hartford were high, but profit margins were below
the levels considered excessive in Schuyt. The case was essentially decided
on the level of profits defendants earned on the funds.131 The judge ruled
against the plaintiff’s theory that sub-advisory fees were not a proper
deduction from revenues in the calculation of profits and found for the
defendants on the basis of the subjective Gartenberg standard.132 However,
if sub-advisory fees were disallowed as legitimate expenses, profit margins
would have exceeded the Schuyt ceilings.
Defendants argued that they bore substantial responsibilities and risks
Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d, No. 17-1653, 2018 WL 3913102 (3d Cir. Aug. 15, 2018).
127. SEAN M. MURPHY ET AL., DEVELOPMENTS IN LITIGATION UNDER SECTION 36(B) OF
THE 1940 ACT §I (2017), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie9505880cf4c11e79bef99c0
ee06c731/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0
&RS=cblt1.0.
128. Kasilag v. Hartford Inv. Fin. Servs., LLC, 745 Fed.Appx. 452, 454 (3d Cir. 2018).
129. Kasilag, No. 11-1083, 2017 WL 773880, *8-11 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2017).
130. Id. at *12.
131. Id. (“The crux of Plaintiffs case largely turns upon the argument that one should
consider the services performed specifically by Defendants as separate and apart from those
performed by the sub-advisor.”).
132. Id. at *14.
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that validated the high levels of profits earned.133 Responsibilities included
establishing fund policy, supervising each fund’s investment program,
providing information to the board of directors, and coordinating matters
relating to the custodian, transfer agent, accountants, attorneys, and other
parties performing services or operational functions.134 Risks included
entrepreneurial, reputational and regulatory/legal risks.
Application of an objective standard tied to the range of fees
determined by arm’s length bargaining puts this decision in its proper
context. A beginning point is to examine the relevant assets, fees, costs
and profits associated with the six funds named in Kasilag. The court
presented a complete financial analysis over the four-year period from
2010 – 2013. For clarity of analysis and exposition the data is here
analyzed for the only the last period, 2013, although the conclusions
reached apply to the whole period. The data of interest are presented in
Table 4:
There were six funds named in the case, which are listed in the left
column of Table 4. Morningstar classified two of the six funds, the
Hartford Capital Appreciation Fund and the Hartford Growth Opportunities
Fund, as Large Cap Funds. It classified the Hartford Balanced Fund as
Fund Allocation – 50% to 70% Equity, the Hartford Floating Rate Fund as
a Bank Loan Fund, the Hartford Inflation Plus Fund as an Inflation
Protected Bond Fund, and the Hartford Healthcare Fund simply as a Health
Fund. The funds ranged in size from $587 million to $11.8 billion in
average assets in 2013. On average the six funds had about $4 billion in
average assets in 2013.
133. Id. at *21.
134. Id. at *3.
Table 4
Analysis of Assets, Fees, Costs and Profits for 2013 in Kasalag v Hartford
Average Assets
Gross
Management
Fees
Advisory
Fee
Rates
Sub-
Advisory
Fees
Sub-
Advisory
Fee
Rates
Operating
Expenses
Operating
Expense
Rates
Total
Expenses Gross Profits
Profit
Margin
Hartford Balanced Fund 627,290,000 4,246,000 0.68% 974,000 0.16% 285,000 0.045% 1,259,000 2,987,000 70.3%
Hartford Capital Appreciation Fund 11,764,413,000 77,255,000 0.66% 29,411,000 0.25% 787,000 0.007% 30,198,000 47,057,000 60.9%
Hartford Floating Rate Fund 6,773,759,000 40,288,000 0.59% 9,483,000 0.14% 562,000 0.008% 10,045,000 30,243,000 75.1%
Hartford Growth Opportunities Fund 2,387,115,000 16,962,000 0.71% 6,454,000 0.27% 346,000 0.014% 6,800,000 10,162,000 59.9%
Hartford Healthcare Fund 578,202,000 5,161,000 0.89% 2,080,000 0.36% 283,000 0.049% 2,363,000 2,798,000 54.2%
Hartford Inflation Plus Fund 1,814,042,000 8,372,000 0.46% 1,197,000 0.07% 338,000 0.019% 1,535,000 6,837,000 81.7%
Averages 3,990,803,500 25,380,667 8,266,500 16,680,667
Weighted Averages 0.64% 0.21% 0.011% 65.7%
Totals 23,944,821,000 152,284,000 49,599,000 2,601,000 52,200,000 100,084,000
2019] MUTUAL FUND ADVISORY FEES 515
Total revenues to Hartford on these six funds for 2013 amounted to
$152 million, which yielded a weighted average advisory fee rate of 64
basis points. Sub-advisory fee costs to Hartford amounted to about $50
million for the year and the weighted average cost of sub-advising by
Wellington Management, the sub-advisor, was 21 basis points.
Hartford incurred operating expenses in addition to sub-advisory fees
of about $2.6 million, which amounted to 1.1 basis points.135 Total
expenses amounted to about $52 million or about 22 basis points. The
combination of Gross Management fee and sub-advisory and operating
expenses yield an overall weighted average profit margin of 65.7%, well
below the Schuyt profit margin ceiling. A discussion of these results will
follow the application of the proposed objective fiduciary standard.
Table 3 shows that at the end of 2017, large cap funds with advisory
fees greater than 41.6 basis points were outside of the range of 95% of fees
determined by arm’s length bargaining, i.e., sub-advisory fees charged to
manage large cap portfolios. Data for large cap funds, including the two
Hartford large cap funds, were sorted into those with fees above 41.6 basis
points and those below that level. The two Hartford funds were in the
former group and, for comparison purposes, Table 5 shows those funds and
a selected sample of funds with asset levels close to the asset levels of the
two Hartford funds. Again, these data are for the end of 2017, four years
after the latest period analyzed in Kasilag.
135. Plaintiff’s expert calculated operating expenses. The profit margins calculated in
Table 4 are nearly identical to the profit margins calculated by Hartford. Operating expenses
seemed to exhibit significant economies of scale. The largest fund was the Capital
Appreciation Fund, whose operating expenses were less than a basis point while the two
smallest funds had operating expenses of almost 5 basis points.
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The principal insight from Table 5 is that several large cap funds with
asset levels similar to the two Hartford large cap funds also have
significantly lower advisory fees. The 12 non-Hartford funds in Panel A
had average assets of about $5.8 billion and average advisory fees of about
34 basis points. In contrast, the two Hartford large cap funds in Panel B
had average assets of about $6.4 billion and average advisory fees double
the level of the funds in Panel A, 68 basis points.
Thus, unlike the conclusion reached by the court in Kasilag, a
relatively straightforward application of an objective fiduciary standard
leads to the conclusion that the Hartford large cap funds were well outside
of the range of advisory fees determined by arm’s length bargaining.136
136. As shown in Tables 4 and 5, in the interim between 2013 and December 2017, the
Table 5
Comparison of Hartford Large Cap Fund Fees to Fees of Selected Funds within the 95 %
Confidence Interval for Sub-Advisory Fees - December 2017
Fund Name
Net Assets
12/17
Advisory
Fee
Rates
Panel A Select Large Cap Funds with Advisory Fees < 41.6 Basis Points - December 2017
Fidelity® Independence Fund 3,905,040,125 0.315
JPMorgan Intrepid America Fund 4,269,393,959 0.399
Putnam Growth Opportunities Fund 4,607,931,980 0.406
Fidelity® Fund 4,626,949,158 0.337
TIAA-CREF Large Cap Growth Fund 4,917,000,697 0.409
State Farm Growth Fund 5,043,276,228 0.103
MFS® Massachusetts Investors Trust 6,584,965,818 0.330
TIAA-CREF Growth & Income Fund 6,831,826,647 0.394
Lord Abbett Affiliated Fund 6,852,833,234 0.316
MFS® Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund 7,143,395,314 0.330
TIAA-CREF Large Cap Value Fund 7,230,613,496 0.392
Fidelity® Capital Appreciation Fund 7,361,086,562 0.340
Averages 5,781,192,768 0.339
Weighted Average 0.340
Panel B - Hartford Large Cap Funds December 2017
Hartford Capital Appreciation Fund 8,161,276,580 0.660
Hartford Growth Opportunities Fund 4,703,068,192 0.705
Averages 6,432,172,386 0.683
Weighted Average 0.677
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The test applied is relatively stringent; Hartford advisory fees are greater
than at least 95% of fees determined by arm’s length bargaining as
represented by sub-advisory fees of similar funds. In fact, the Hartford
large cap advisory fees are more than four standard deviations (0.189 + 4
times 0.113 = 0.641) greater than average sub-advisory fees, which means
that essentially all of the sub-advisory fees in the large cap universe are less
than Hartford large cap fees.
This is not to say that the non-Hartford funds in Panel A carry the
equivalent of arm’s length determined fees. On the contrary, indications
are that they do not. The weighted average sub-advisory fee of large cap
funds in Table 3 was about 16 basis points for funds with an average level
of assets of about $7 billion, only slightly greater than the average fund in
Panel A of Table 5. So, the average advisory fee of the funds in Panel A of
Table 5 was double the average sub-advisory fees on sub-advised large cap
funds of a similar size. The Hartford large cap fees were quadruple the
level of sub-advised large cap funds.
The other four Hartford funds named in the case had different
Morningstar Categories that generally contained fewer funds, lower total
assets and smaller funds.137 There was a concomitant decrease in the
number of sub-advised funds available for comparison purposes. An
analysis parallel to the two large cap funds is presented in Table 6. The
results are like the results for large cap funds. In December 2017 there
were 189 balanced funds with 50% to 70% equity in the Morningstar
database, 31 of which were sub-advised. The average sub-advisory fee was
20.2 basis points and with a standard deviation of 12.8 basis points,
yielding an upper 95% confidence interval of 46.3 basis points. The
advisory fee on the Hartford Balanced Fund was 66.3 basis points, greater
than the 95% upper confidence interval. The balance of Table 6
demonstrates that similar to the large cap and balanced funds, the other
three funds named had advisory fees above the 95% confidence interval for
fees determined by arm’s length bargaining.138
Hartford Capital Appreciation fund saw assets decrease from $11.7 billion to $8.1 billion,
while its advisory fee was constant at 66 basis points. The Hartford Growth Opportunities
Fund grew from about $2.4 billion to $4.7 billion over the same period and its advisory fee
fell by about half a basis point.
137. Kasilag, No. 11-1083, 2017 WL 773880, *3.
138. Unlike Large Cap Funds, the vast majority of the advisory fees of the funds in
Table 6 were greater than the upper limit of the 95% confidence interval.
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A straightforward application of the objective fiduciary standard
developed here clearly indicates that the named funds in Kasilag carried
advisory fees outside of the range of fees determined by arm’s length
bargaining. Yet the Kasilag court found for the defendants, another
indication that something is amiss with judicial interpretations of § 36(b).
IX. APPLICATION OF THE GARTENBERG STANDARD IN KASILAG
Lost in the arguments about standards and their judicial interpretation
is the fundamental fact that mutual funds are structurally different from
other corporations. The mutual fund corporation or trust is inextricably
tied to the investment manager/fund sponsor who cannot be fired. Thus,
the fund faces a monopoly seller of investment advisory services. This
monopoly is the genesis of the need to compare advisory fees to fees
determined at arm’s length. If advisory fees are not a reasonable
approximation of fees determined by market forces then there is reason to
believe that fund investors are overcharged for investment advisory
services and that fund sponsors earn monopoly or economic profits, also
known as rents.
The Hartford mutual fund complex was “managed” by the Hartford
Funds Management Company, LLP. In December of 2018, the complex
comprised seventy-two Hartford mutual funds with a total of $116 billion
of assets under management, $113 billion or ninety-seven percent of which
Table 6
Comparison of Hartford Advisory Fees to the 95% Confidence Interval for Sub-Advisory Fees,
Balanced, Bank Loan, Health and Inflation Protected Funds - December 2017
Number
of Funds
Number
of Sub-
Advised
Funds
Average
Advisory
Fee
Average
Sub-
Advisory
Fee
Standard
Deviation
of Sub
Advisory
Fees
Upper
95%
Confidence
Limit of
Sub
Advisory
Fees
Hartford
Advisory
Fee
Balanced Funds 189 31 0.511 0.202 0.128 0.463
The Hartford Balanced Fund 0.663
Bank Loan Funds 55 12 0.594 0.252 0.063 0.377
Hartford Floating Rate Fund 0.602
Health Funds 33 5 0.759 0.263 0.089 0.442
The Hartford Healthcare Fund 0.852
Inflation Protected Funds 45 6 0.365 0.152 0.078 0.308
Hartford Inflation Plus Fund 0.494
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was sub-advised.139 Wellington Management Company had responsibility
for about $1 trillion in assets and Schroder Investment Management
Company was responsible for the balance of about $593.3 billion.140
Wellington and Schroder were and are for profit companies, and thus it is
to be expected that they earned a normal and competitive profit margin or
rate of return for the management services they provided (investing).
Given the above information, it can be concluded that Hartford
Investment Management Company did not do investment management in
the usual sense of the word. The plaintiff’s expert calculated that Hartford
had the equivalent of about twenty-one full-time employees managing the
fifty plus funds in the complex from 2010 to 2013, less than one full-time
employee per fund.141 Thus, Hartford did not employ any of the usual
analysts and portfolio managers. As revealed above, investment
management of about 97% of Hartford mutual fund assets was sub-
contracted out.142 Hartford was truly a “Manager of Managers.”
Consider again the contents of Table 4 above. Hartford received
about $152 million in gross management fees from the six funds named in
the suit in 2013. The six funds had average assets in 2013 of about $24
billion so that that the weighted average management fee was 64 basis
points. There were about $52 million of total expenses composed of $49.6
million in sub-advisory fees paid to Wellington Management and about
$2.6 million of internal operating expenses.
It follows that gross profits (revenues minus costs) to Hartford on the
six named funds were about $100 million for 2013. In context, Hartford
made $100 million on funds for which it had sub-contracted out all the core
investment functions: investment analysis, portfolio management, cash
139. About Us, HARTFORD FUNDS, https://www.hartfordfunds.com/about-us.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2019). https://perma.cc/L2ZX-3JGH
140. About Wellington Management, HARTFORD FUNDS, https://www.hartfordfunds.com/
insights/AboutWellingtonManagement.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2019); About Schroders,
HARTFORD FUNDS, https://www.hartfordfunds.com/insights/about-schroders.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2019).
141. Kasilag, No. 11-1083, 2017 WL 773880 at *13.
142. There were four funds with about 3 percent of the assets “managed” in house by
two employees, Vernon J. Meyer, Managing Director and Chief Investment Officer, and
Allison Mortensen, Head of Multi-Asset Solutions and Managing Director. Meyer and
Mortenson oversaw four asset allocation funds (Checks and Balances, Conservative
Allocation, Growth Allocation, and Moderate Allocation), all of which were Fund of Funds,
which means that there was no selection of individual securities, just in the proportion of the
different funds managed by others. Morningstar shows the advisory fee on these funds as
ten basis points plus, presumably, the advisory fees on the sub funds. Current information
on all Hartford mutual funds may be found: Mutual Funds, Hartford Funds, https://www.har
tfordfunds.com/funds.html#fundbasics-tab (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
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management, etc. Wellington Management performed those functions for
about $50 million.143 Included in that $50 million was a normal level of
profit to the sub-advising firms. Hartford performed certain oversight,
strategic and regulatory functions for which it explicitly expended about
$2.5 million.144
The threshold question is: how much of that $100 million in profit is
justifiable, and how much is economic profit? Common sense suggests
that most, if not all of it is economic profit accruing to Hartford because of
its monopoly position vis-a-vis its captive funds. Hartford made $100
million for investment management services it did not provide, indeed,
given staffing levels, was unable to provide. Nonetheless, the district court
in Kasilag found:
Although the costs that were directly incurred by Defendants
were low in relation to the gross management fee that was paid,
the Court finds that a consideration of all of the services
performed, including those performed by sub-advisers, Plaintiffs
have not carried the burden of showing that the nature of the
services indicates the fees were so disproportionate that they
could not have been negotiated at arm’s-length. This is
particularly so in light of the risks that were also borne by
Defendants . . . . 145
The subjective portion of the Gartenberg standard is on full display.
The court rationalized its decision by noting the entrepreneurial and
reputational risks borne by defendants. This rationale is absurd on its face.
Entrepreneurial risk is the risk from starting a new business, and the named
funds had been in existence for a long time, two since 1996.146 All of the
named funds were well established with hundreds of millions of assets
under management. Four of the six funds had asset levels of more than $1
billion, one more than $10 billion.147 Similarly, reputational risk is likely to
be minimal and unimportant. Yet the court gave much credence to these
risks, principally because the defendants viewed them as important.148
Application of the Pepper v. Litton fiduciary standard would lead to
the conclusion that the fees charged by Hartford to “manage” these six
funds do not carry the earmarks of an arm’s length negotiation. Similarly,
143. Table 4.
144. Id.
145. Kasilag, No. 11-1083, 2017 WL 773880, at *21.
146. Mutual Funds, HARTFORD FUNDS, https://www.hartfordfunds.com/funds.html#perfo
rmance-tab (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
147. Table 4.
148. Kasilag, No. 11-1083, 2017 WL 773880, *7.
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the fees on these funds were outside of the range of fees determined by
arm’s length bargaining, as demonstrated here in Table 5 and 6. An
objective application of the subjective Gartenberg standard would similarly
lead to the conclusion that the fees in this case were so disproportionately
large that they could not have been the product of an arm’s length
negotiation. Hartford realized profits that were double the level of the
costs, essentially all of which were sub-advisory fees for which the sub-
advisors earned a normal profit on the revenues involved.
Finally, application of what is essentially the corporate waste standard
should have shocked the conscience of the court. That the Kasilag court
did not recognize the obvious disparity between the fees Hartford charged
its captive funds and the costs it incurred seems inexplicable to the author.
What it amounts to is that one can believe the Kasilag court and by
inference the subjective Gartenberg standard, or one can conclude that
something is indeed wrong with the judiciary’s interpretation of § 36(b).
It follows that if the Kasilag court and other courts that have used the
subjective Gartenberg standard were in error, then the independent
directors of the subject funds were equally in error. Independent directors
are charged as “watchdogs” looking out for the interests of fund
shareholders, not fund sponsors. Yet the independent directors had all of
the information available to the court and more, and the author believes that
they, too, chose to avert their eyes in the face of gross overcharging of fund
shareholders.
The paper started with the premise that something was amiss with §
36(b) and that the problem was that the Gartenberg standard was overly
subjective. The evidence that something is amiss with § 36(b) is also,
however, evidence that something is amiss with fund governance.
Consider the outcome in Kasilag. Hartford subcontracted all investment
management duties to a sub-advisor who charged about $50 million for
those services and earned normal profits in the process. Hartford realized
about $100 million in profit for which it performed minimal oversight and
administrative duties and absorbed little real risk. The Hartford fees were
clearly greater than the upper 95% confidence limit of sub-advisory fees,
an objective fiduciary standard. In some sense the Kasilag court was
willfully blind to the realities of the fees involved and, similarly, the board
of directors was willfully blind.
In defense of the Kasilag court and other courts that have applied the
subjective Gartenberg standard, it would take extraordinary courage to
reinterpret almost forty years of precedent and say that the standard set out
in Gartenberg before the “therefore” is not the same standard as that set out
following it and that this objective standard should be applied instead of the
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subjective standard. Such a finding would effectively involve fee setting
by the judiciary and unleash a flood of litigation that could significantly
strain the judicial system. It seems unimaginable that the judicial system
could have strayed so far from the apparent explicit wishes of Congress
that it wanted fairer fees, or at least said it did. The reality is far more
complicated.
Application of the objective fiduciary standard developed here and
applied to an actual case is compelling evidence in support of the
proposition that the Gartenberg standard is punitive to plaintiffs in § 36(b)
cases. The next section of the paper develops a theory that explains this
apparent anomaly.
X. THE GARTENBERG STANDARD: A THEORY
“Laws, like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we
know how they are made.”149 The 1970 amendments to the ICA were no
exception, following a torturous path from hearings begun in 1967 to
passage in 1970. The legislation is generally viewed as a both a political
and cosmetic compromise between the SEC, the public interest, and the
Investment Company Institute, representing the investment management
industry.150 In its operation, the ICA has been a clear win for the
investment management industry, hence the observation by Johnson and
this paper that something is amiss with § 36(b).
In the 1920s and 1930s, the mutual fund industry suffered from a
multitude of abuses including self-dealing, excessive fee levels, improperly
valued securities, and misleading advertising and accounting practices.151
The 1940 ICA dealt effectively with most of these problems.152 Congress
included in the 1940 ICA a provision directing the SEC to study the impact
of investment company growth and submit a report to Congress at a later
date.153 In 1958, the SEC commissioned the Wharton School of Finance to
prepare a study of the effects of the growth in the industry. The Wharton
149. Attributed to John Godfrey Saxe, THE DAILY CLEVELAND HERALD, Mar. 29, 1869
(and often wrongly attributed to Otto von Bismarck). See Fred R. Shapiro, Quote . . .
Misquote (July 21, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/21/magazine/27wwwl-guestsa
firet.html, https://perma.cc/3R7B-TMC2 (tracing the often-misrepresented quotation back to
its origin).
150. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 559 U.S. 335, 340 (2010).
151. Amy B. R. Lancellotta, et al., Fund Governance: A Successful, Evolving Model, 10
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 455, 458-89 (2016).
152. S. Rep. No. 184, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14(b) (2012)
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Study154 and a subsequent SEC report155 included legislative
recommendations.
The essence of the Wharton and PPI empirical findings are presented
above in Table 1. Both studies found that mutual fund investors are
overcharged relative to fees determined by arm’s length bargaining. Both
studies attributed this overcharging to the structural anomaly of mutual
fund organizations where there exists an inseverable relationship between
the fund and the fund sponsor/investment management firm. Importantly,
both studies identified a systemic problem: fees were too high in the whole
industry as compared to fees determined by arm’s length bargaining. As
the Letter of Transmittal from the SEC to Congress of the PPI Study states:
The report concludes that mutual fund shareholders need
protection against incurring excessive costs in the acquisition and
management of their investments and that, given the structure
and incentives prevailing in the industry, neither competition nor
the few elementary safeguards against conflict of interest deemed
sufficient in 1940 and contained in the Investment Company Act
presently provide this protection in adequate measure. . . . It is
recommended that the statute be amended to expressly require
that the compensation received by persons affiliated with
investment companies, including their management
organizations, for services furnished to an investment company
be reasonable, and that this standard be enforceable in the
courts.156
The SEC recommendation met with immediate pushback from the
industry.157 The outline of the disagreement became obvious very early in
the process where, during a 1967 House hearing, the SEC outlined its
position.158 A key element was the finding that unaffiliated/independent
directors of mutual funds were not in a position to discipline advisory fees,
as stated in testimony by Manuel Cohen, Chairman of the SEC:
[N]egotiations between unaffiliated directors and fund advisers
over fees lack an essential element of arm’s length bargaining –
the threat of terminating negotiations and contracting with other
154. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 4.
155. PPI STUDY, supra note 5.
156. Id. at viii. The Wharton and PPI Reports were also skeptical of the ability of fund
directors to meaningfully impact on the level of advisory fees.
157. Brown, Some Analytical Clarity, supra note 22, at 339 (2016).
158. Investment Company Act Amendments of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 9510 and
H.R. 9511, Pt. 1, 90th Cong. 43-44 (1967).
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parties. . . . Nevertheless, the industry insists on propagating the
myth that unaffiliated directors have served as an effective
control over advisory fees. For example, only recently during the
hearings on this Bill before the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency the president of one of the largest Advisory
organizations, appearing on behalf of the Investment Company
Institute, testified that unaffiliated directors have “real power
over the advisers”, “have substantial influence over the
management policies of the company” and “are well equipped to
make” a judgement as to the reasonableness of fees. These
statements, however, are flatly contradicted by the sworn
testimony of the directors of the largest mutual fund managed by
this individual’s own company contained in the public court
records of an action against the fund, alleging that the advisory
fees paid by the fund were unreasonable and excessive.159
The SEC believed that when given a clear mandate, enforceable in
court, that fees be reasonable, mutual fund boards would be effective in
negotiating reasonable fees.160 For those instances where fees continued to
be unreasonable the SEC envisioned that it would have a role in assisting
the judiciary:
But, since our proposal will not eliminate the basic conflict of
interest inherent in the typical investment company structure, an
adequate means of enforcement of the standard is essential. In
this respect the availability of judicial review will provide an
indispensable deterrent to unreasonable fees and will, we believe,
greatly assist in preventing such fees. In the few cases in which
it does not do so, actions to enforce the statutory standard of
reasonableness in the courts could be brought by the Commission
in or, under well-established judicial precedent, by the
investment company itself or by a shareholder on its behalf. To
assist the courts in an orderly development of the law governing
the statutory standard of reasonableness the Commission would
be authorized to intervene in all private litigation brought to
enforce the standard.161
159. Investment Company Act Amendments of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 9510 and
H.R. 9511, Pt. 1, 90th Cong. 41, 46 (1967) (citations omitted) (statement of Manuel F.
Cohen, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission).
160. Id. at 44 (“We believe that most Investment company directors can be expected to
heed the Congressional mandate that advisory fees and other charges for services made by
investment advisers and other affiliated persons must be reasonable.”).
161. Id.
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Chairman Cohen also outlined the then current state of case law and
the inability of plaintiffs to prevail in fee cases because of the prevailing
corporate waste standard.162
The Investment Company Institute had a different view of the
proposed reasonableness standard. Here is a condensation of the 1967
House testimony of Mr. John R. Haire, chairman-elect, Investment
Company Institute:
I would like to emphasize first that in these two critical areas,
sales charges and management fees, we are not dealing with the
regulation of dishonesty or mismanagement. We are dealing
with proposals to regulate prices and profits in an industry which
is free of monopoly, in an industry into which competition can
entry freely, in an industry which fully discloses its charges to
the public, in an industry which offers the public the widest range
of. . . management fees. . . . Under the [proposed bill] various
courts would be asked to determine whether a management fee is
reasonable in the light of. . . vague and general standards. . . .
[The bill] imposes on the judge the duty to evaluate the
reasonableness of the fee itself, attaching no particular weight to
the evidence of the good faith and careful deliberation of the
directors or the approval by the fund’s shareholders who pay the
fee. It in effect constitutes the judge as a “super-director”
charged with substituting his own judgment for the business
judgment of the directors who have an intimate knowledge of the
fund’s operation. The SEC thus in our judgment proposes a true
rate making statute.163
These statements distill the essence of the disagreement between the
SEC, acting in the public interest, and the Investment Management
Industry, acting to defend its interests. The initial results were a stalemate.
Bills introduced in 1967 and 1968 that would have required that fees be
reasonable were defeated, a testament to the political power of the
investment management industry.164
Between the end of the 1968 legislative session and the holding of
162. Investment Company Act Amendments of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 9510 and
H.R. 9511, Pt. 1, 90th Cong. 105-06 (1967) (Statement No. 2 of Hon. Manuel Cohen,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
163. Investment Company Act Amendments of 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 9510 and
H.R. 9511, Pt. 1, 90th Cong. 233, 242 (1967) (statement of John R. Haire, Chairman-elect,
Investment Company Institute).
164. S. 1659, 90th Cong. § 8 (1967); S. 3724, 90th Cong. § 8 (1968).
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additional Congressional hearings in 1969, members of the House and
Senate committees drafting revised legislation met several times with
officers of the Investment Company Institute.165 As a result, the 1970
amendments to the ICA removed the “reasonableness” standard opposed by
the ICI, made investment advisers fiduciaries with respect to fees,166 and
gave investors a private cause of action.167
As discussed above, the Senate in its deliberations and the final report
of the Committee on Banking and Currency seemed to make clear that it
wanted fairer fees and replacement of the corporate waste standard.
Making fund sponsors fiduciaries with respect to fees was the supposed
vehicle to achieve this result. However, as clear as that seemed, in the
balance of the report the Senate included language that essentially endorsed
the status quo:
In reporting this bill, your committee recognizes the importance
of permitting adequate compensation and incentives so that men
of ability and integrity will continue to be attracted to the mutual
fund industry. . . . Your committee recognizes the fact that the
investment adviser is entitled to make a profit. . . . It is not
intended to introduce general concepts of rate regulation as
applied to public utilities. . . . This section is not intended to
authorize a court to substitute its business judgment for that of
the mutual fund’s board of directors in the area of management
fees. . . . This provision does not represent a finding by the
committee as to the level of fees in the industry. Your committee
does not believe itself qualified to make such judgments. Nor is
it contemplated that the Commission will seek a general
reduction of fees on an industrywide basis.168
165. Hearings on S. 34 and S. 296 Before the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong. 8 (statement of Hugh F. Owens, Commissioner, SEC); see also Hearings on H.R.
11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754, and H.R. 14737 Before the H. Comm. on Commerce and Fin.
of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. 172 (1969) (statement of
Hamer H. Budge, Chairman, SEC) (saying “Chairman Sparkman stated that this bill was
worked out between the industry and the Commission as well as with members of his
committee.”)
166. See Investment Company Amendment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 35(b), 84
Stat. 1413 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2012)) (explaining that
investment advisors are deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to compensation for
their services).
167. Id.
168. INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1969, S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 4-7
(1969). The legislation also provided for a one-year look-back period for damages. This
effectively limited monetary penalties and ignored the general principle that the damages
period should conform to the period of wrongdoing.
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To observe that the Senate Report sends conflicting signals is an
understatement. While bowing in the direction of fairer fees and
eschewing the corporate waste standard, the report also essentially
repudiates the findings of the Wharton and PPI reports. What is clear is
that in the end the Congress folded under intense political pressure from the
ICI. It had to appear to do something, hence the statutory change making
investment managers fiduciaries. However, at the same time, it neutered
the SEC going forward and, despite SEC objections, endorsed the notion
that mutual fund boards could be trusted to discipline fees.169 It also
signaled that profit levels were inviolate and that the overall level of fees in
the industry was not to change.
What the Congress did in 1970 was what politicians always do—they
crafted a political compromise that had the appearance of solving the
problems at hand. However, laws passed by legislatures cannot repeal the
laws of economics, and the overcharging documented by the Wharton
Report and PPI Study did not disappear. What Congress did was pass the
whole contradictory mess on to the judiciary to sort out.
A political compromise cannot paper over the fundamental fact that
the choices faced by the judiciary were binary in nature. It is impossible to
have both fairer fees and maintain the status quo of fees.
Fast forward to 1980. The Second Circuit in Gartenberg had to deal
with the binary choice outlined above. It could have followed the
recommendations of the financial experts at Wharton and the SEC and
found that the fees at issue did not carry the earmarks of arm’s length
negotiation. As the Second Circuit correctly said in Gartenberg, there is no
essential difference between a fiduciary standard and a reasonableness
standard and, in the final analysis, both involve something like rate
regulation.170 But Congress clearly signaled it did not want rate regulation.
Instead, the Second Circuit crafted a fiduciary standard so stringent
169. Id. The language that a court is not authorized to substitute its business judgment
for that of the mutual fund’s board of directors in the area of management fees adopted a
long-standing common law rule. See cases cited in Lasker v. Burks, 404 F.Supp. 1172,
1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that “absent fraud or corruption or other disqualifying
factor, the good faith business judgment of the directors not to bring suit is final”) and
subsequently approved in Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 474-75 (1979) (upholding the use
of the business judgment rule to dismiss derivative suits). The rule contradicts the stubborn
fact that fund boards are unable to negotiate fees because they cannot fire the investment
manager.
170. Gartenberg v. Merill Lynch Asset Mgt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982). It
will be argued in the summary and conclusions that the concern about rate regulation is
overblown and, with the help of the SEC, a less cumbersome and much simpler procedure
could be put in place to achieve the same result.
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and subjective that no plaintiff could be expected to or has overcome it,
which leads to speculation on why the Second Circuit crafted such a
stringent standard. Assuming the court recognized the political pressure on
Congress and the economic reality underpinning it, it had to choose
between protecting the public interest or protecting the mutual fund
industry. The Senate Report provided some cover for either position. The
court chose the latter.171
There is perhaps a more insidious motivation for the decision in
Gartenberg. Recall that Langevoort considered that the test set out in
Gartenberg resembles the state law test for corporate waste, despite
Congress’s stated desire for something more than a waste test.172 It was
“obvious” to Langevoort that the court did not want to get into the business
of fee setting on its own. This reinforces the notion that the choice was
binary in nature: either the Second Circuit could establish a very restrictive
standard or the courts would be in the fee setting business with little
support from the SEC, which had been effectively neutered by the Senate
Report and would thus not be available to provide its expertise to the
courts. The Langevoort comment, while apparently innocuous, suggests a
motive of self-interest on the part of the judiciary. What this implies is that
for almost forty years, acting at least partially in self-interest, the judiciary
has been biased against plaintiffs in § 36(b) cases. The fact that most cases
have been settled or dismissed, that very few cases have gone to trial, and
that no plaintiff has ever received an award under the § 36(b), is consistent
with this observation.
XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
John Adams famously said that “[f]acts are stubborn things.”173 It is
fundamental that mutual funds are structurally different from other
corporations. The corporation or trust is controlled by an external entity:
the fund sponsor. From this immutable circumstance flow all the legal,
political and economic issues surrounding mutual fund advisory fees. Fund
sponsors are monopolists and charge fees substantially greater than fees
determined by arm’s length bargaining. Fund boards are impotent because
they cannot fire fund sponsors.
171. INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1969, S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 4-7
(1969).
172. Langevoort, Private Litigation, supra note 59, at 1024.
173. WILLIAM GORDON, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND ESTABLISHMENT, OF
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 296 (1788).
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Monopolists earn economic profits or rents. It took willful blindness
on the part of the Kasilag court not to recognize that the $100 million in
profits earned by Hartford for doing essentially very little or nothing was
excessive by any reasonable standard. Hartford is a microcosm of the
mutual fund investment management industry. A recent paper estimated
that the industry overcharges mutual fund investors about $30 billion per
year.174 If that estimate is anywhere near accurate it implies that since
Gartenberg investors have been cumulatively overcharged hundreds of
billions of dollars in excess fees.
Economic profits have vastly enriched the shareholders of investment
management firms. In the same paper referenced above, the authors
identified the universe of publicly traded mutual fund investment
management firms. They constructed an index of the stock prices of those
firms and tracked its returns from 1980 through 2016. The compound
average rate of return on S&P 500 stocks over that period was an annual
8.5%.175 Over the same period, the compound average annual return on the
index of mutual fund managers was 18.7%, more than double.176 Putting
this in context, an investment of $1 in the S&P 500 in 1980 would have
grown to $20.74 by 2016, while an investment in the index of fund
sponsors would have grown to $563.59. Mutual fund investment
management is a very profitable business.
The profits from managing mutual funds have given the investment
management industry an outsized influence on the political process.
Mancur Olson, in his book “The Logic of Collective Action” posited that
some groups have a larger impact on government policies than others.177 In
a democratic system, people with common interests will generally band
together to achieve common goals. However, if the benefits of a political
outcome are concentrated in the hands of a few and the costs are diffused
among many, the beneficiaries are motivated to influence the political
process in their favor. At the same time, those who bear the costs have
little incentive to organize to protect their interests. Thus, because of
extraordinarily high profits, the investment management industry is
incentivized to influence the political process. On the other hand, the $30
billion in excess fees mentioned above is currently spread among about
ninety million investors so that on average each investor pays about $300
per year in excess fees. With the SEC effectively captured by the
174. Brown & Pomerantz, Some Clarity, supra note 15, at 807.
175. Id. at 811.
176. Id.
177. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 127-28 (1965).
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investment management industry, there is currently no effective voice
speaking in the public interest in the political process.
This was not always the case. The main impetus for the 1970
amendments to the ICA was the legislative recommendation of the SEC in
the PPI Study. Congress was forced to deal with the SEC’s proposed
reasonableness standard. Congress handled it by endorsing the concept of
fairer fees while simultaneously singing the praises of men of ability and
integrity in the mutual fund industry and signaling to the SEC to keep its
hands-off mutual fund fees. After sending clear signals of its intent,
Congress turned over the problem of excessive fees to the judiciary.
The 1970 amendments to the ICA made investment managers
fiduciaries with respect to fees. Ostensibly, this was consistent with a
reasonableness standard and with fairer fees. Simultaneously, however,
Congress signaled that it wanted to maintain the status quo. There was
enough ambiguity in the Senate Report that the Gartenberg court could
have gone the other way and established a fiduciary standard imposing
lower fees at the margin. As Professor Langevoort opined, this would have
put the judiciary in the fee setting business, which the judiciary was
reluctant to do absent the participation of the SEC. Consequently, the
Gartenberg standard in operation has been indistinguishable from the
corporate waste standard. The investment management industry has
profited handsomely from the situation and investors have been
cumulatively overcharged hundreds of billions of dollars.
It is a truism that if you subsidize something, you will get more of it.
In 1965, when the PPI Study was published, total mutual fund assets were
about $35 billion. By 1980, when the Gartenberg case was filed, assets
totaled about $135 billion. At the end of 2017, open end mutual fund
assets totaled $18.7 trillion.178 Neither Congress nor the judiciary could
have foreseen the phenomenal growth in mutual funds. By imposing an
extreme fiduciary standard in 1982, the judiciary is caught in a trap of its
own design. In spite of accumulating evidence that advisory fees are too
high, the judiciary must avert its eyes because to reverse itself would cause
disruption in the financial system and effectively put the judiciary in the fee
setting business. The judicial system is riding a horse it can’t get off.
Under current circumstances, it is difficult to visualize a resolution of
the problem. Given the outsized political influence of the investment
management industry, it is unrealistic to expect a legislative solution.
178. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2018 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 208
(58th ed. 2018), http://www.icifactbook.org/deployedfiles/FactBook/Site%20Properties/pdf/
2018/2018_factbook.pdf. [https://perma.cc/M5AD-SY3R].
2019] MUTUAL FUND ADVISORY FEES 531
Armed with the objective fiduciary standard developed here, it is possible
but unlikely that a federal court could refuse to avert its eyes to evidence of
excess mutual fund advisory fees. Ideally, but equally unlikely, the SEC
could escape capture from the investment management industry and use its
standing to sue. It could choose an egregious example of excess advisory
fees and litigate to a resolution.
The SEC is the ideal institution to resolve the advisory fee problem
because it could do so in a manner that minimizes the disruption to the
investment management and mutual fund industries. The infrastructure is
already in place for an orderly and non-disruptive decrease in advisory fees
in reports routinely received by mutual funds’ boards pursuant to § 15(c) of
the 1940 ICA.179 Similar to the last column of Table 4, boards of directors
routinely monitor the profit margins of the funds they represent to ensure
that levels do not exceed the maximum levels recognized in Schuyt.
The proposed solution would not involve rate regulation in any
meaningful sense. Rate regulation in the public utility arena is shorthand
for rate of return regulation. The idea is to allow public utilities, which are
natural monopolies, to earn a rate of return on invested capital like the rates
of return on invested capital of firms where such rates are determined in the
marketplace, i.e., by arm’s length bargaining. Public utility rate regulation
is cumbersome and expensive because it involves public utility
commissions and extensive public hearings to affect any sort of change in
rates. This would not be the case for mutual funds.
The SEC-initiated litigation could establish precedent of a new,
market-based profit margin standard. The unrealistically high profit
margin standard in place (Schuyt) is routinely monitored by fund boards to
ensure compliance with existing case law. The goal of the SEC in
litigation would be to introduce into evidence a range of profit margins of
firms managing portfolios where the fees are determined by arm’s length
negotiation, i.e., pension and mutual fund sub-advised portfolios. The
revised profit margin standard would be lower than the current Schuyt
standard.180 A revised profit margin standard would empower independent
179. Section 15 of the 1940 ICA governs the terms of continuing, amending and
terminating the advisory contract. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
15(c) (2012). As part of the annual contract renewal process, boards receive what are
known as 15(c) reports. In renewing the advisory contract annually, boards are required to
consider the advisory fee in the context of the Gartenberg factors, including the profitability
of the contract to the fund advisor.
180. This should be obvious because sub-advisory fees are a relatively small fraction of
advisory fees for performing essentially the same functions. The Wharton Report looked at
operating expense ratios (costs as a percent of revenue) for 86 investment management
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directors in a manner originally envisioned by the SEC in the 1960s.
Independent directors would have the duty and leverage to reduce advisory
fees to levels consistent with arm’s length bargaining. The revised
standard would recognize that investment management firms are entitled to
make a profit and would not introduce rate regulation in the same sense that
public utilities are subject to rate regulation. The new, reduced level of
profitability, consistent arm’s length bargaining, would reduce or eliminate
economic profits.
This method would not be a one-size-fits-all fee setting procedure.
Appropriate adjustments could be made for, inter alia, cost differentials
related to risk premiums, the size of the portfolio, and the investment
objective involved, as well as the cost structure of the investment
management firms involved.
The beauty of this approach is that it facilitates a smooth transition
with a minimum of disruption to existing procedures. The SEC could
announce a grace period for funds to come into compliance with the new
standard. Independent directors armed with the new standard could
negotiate lower fees over time and there would be a minimum need for
further litigation. In all likelihood judiciary caseloads would decrease. The
ultimate result would be fairer fees for investors.
corporations and found that “total operating expense ratios are sharply higher in those cases
where income is received from both investment company and noninvestment company
clients than in cases where the adviser is managing investment company assets only.”
WHARTON REPORT, supra note 4, at 495. Sharply higher operating ratios implies sharply
lower profit margins.
